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CRIMINALIZATION: A KANTIAN VIEW 
JASON R STEFFEN* 
ABSTRACT 
 
One problem in criminal justice theory is determining what kinds of acts 
ought to be criminalized. A related practical concern is the rampant 
overcriminalization in American law. In this Article, I propose to address 
both of these problems by positing a theory of criminalization based upon 
Immanuel Kant’s political theory. I begin by explaining Kant’s account of 
civic freedom. I show that free and equal citizens in a just political 
community must refrain from actions that violate the political freedom of 
other citizens. From this, I derive a definition of crime as an act that by its 
nature violates the political conditions of freedom, with the added 
requirement that the actor’s maxim is incompatible with Kant’s Universal 
Principle of Right. Finally, I apply this definition to modern criminal codes, 
concluding that the Kantian approach would result in a more limited 
criminal justice system based on reason rather than political happenstance. 
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Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law. J.D. Harvard Law School; Ph.D. University of 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars familiar with Anglo-American criminal justice systems 
would agree with the proposition that we criminalize too much conduct and 
punish that conduct too severely. This is particularly true in the United 
States. As philosopher Douglas Husak puts it, “[t]he two most distinctive 
characteristics of . . . criminal justice in the United States . . . are the dramatic 
expansion in the substantive criminal law and the extraordinary rise in the 
use of punishment. . . . In short, the most pressing problem with the criminal 
law today is that we have too much of it.”1 Criminal-law scholar William 
Stuntz concurs, noting that “for the past generation, virtually everyone who 
has written about federal criminal law has bemoaned its expansion,” and the 
same applies to state-level criminal codes.2 
 The problem here is not merely one of bureaucratic overzealousness. 
The human costs of ever-expanding criminal codes, and the concomitant 
increase in punishments, is striking. First, there is the sheer number of 
citizens who are labeled criminals. As of 2016, between six and seven 
million people in the United States were either incarcerated or restricted by 
probation or parole; this number has increased from less than two million in 
1980.3 Moreover, the rate of incarceration has also increased,4 and is higher 
than virtually any other place on Earth for which accurate criminal justice 
statistics are available.5 The severity of punishments, too, has increased 
 
 
1. DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION 3 (2008). 
2. William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 508, 
512-23 (2001). 
3. Key Statistic: Total Correctional Population, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Sept. 8, 
2019), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=kfdetail&iid=487 [https://perma.cc/AW78-LTQ8]. The 
numerical figures for the chart at this site are available by clicking on the “Excel” link. It should be noted 
that the same chart does show a modest but noticeable decrease since 2007, apparently attributable 
mainly to a decrease in the number of people on probation, and perhaps reflective of an increasing public 
and political awareness of the overcriminalization phenomenon. 
4.  This trend may be stabilizing or even reversing, however. In 1980, the incarceration rate 
for adult U.S. residents was 0.3%; it rose to a rate of nearly 1% in the late 1990s and has remained 
relatively constant since then, with a noticeable decrease since 2007. Key Statistic: Incarceration Rate, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=kfdetail&iid=493 
[https://perma.cc/6ND4-P9YJ]. The adult correctional population in the U.S. in 2012 was 2.9%, the 
same rate as in 1997. Lauren Glaze & Erinn Herberman, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Correctional 
Populations in the United States, 2012, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1 (2013), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus12.pdf [https://perma.cc/VVL3-ES5S]. Despite these 
promising signs, the number and percentage of people within the criminal justice system remains 
markedly higher than it was several decades ago. 
5. The United States has the highest total prison population of any country on Earth, at 
roughly 2.1 million. The next closest country is China, with 1.6 million. As to the rate of incarceration, 
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alongside incarceration rates.6 Finally, racial disparities continue to plague 
our justice system.7 
 While we might point to a number of interrelated causes of the 
overcriminalization crisis, both Husak and Stuntz argue that this social 
phenomenon is a symptom of a larger problem: that we as a society have 
failed to develop any principled basis for determining what kind of conduct 
is an appropriate target for criminalization. Stuntz thus laments that 
“American criminal law’s historical development has borne no relation to 
any plausible normative theory—unless ‘more’ counts as a normative 
theory.”8 Husak, meanwhile, believes that finding the right theory of 
criminalization would help curtail the seemingly unchecked growth of the 
 
 
the United States ranks first, and far higher than other large Western nations. ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD 
PRISON BRIEF, INST. FOR CRIMINAL POLICY RESEARCH, World Prison Population List (2018), 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/ resources/downloads/wppl_12.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2EFB-2S6F] (last visited March 23, 2019). There is a convenient tool to parse this data 
on the ICPR website. Highest to Lowest – Prison Population Total, ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON 
BRIEF, INST. FOR CRIMINAL POLICY RESEARCH, http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest 
[https://perma.cc/MET5-ZAFH]. To be fair, information is not available for a few countries, such as 
North Korea, and it may be that some countries have a low incarceration rate because they have other 
means of dealing with convicted criminals, such as putting them to death. Still, the results are striking 
even given such caveats.  
It should also be noted that the First Step Act was signed into law by President Trump on 
December 21, 2018. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. This law is a promising 
step in criminal justice reform—for example, it shortens some prison sentences in the federal system. It 
is still too early to determine how significant an impact it will have on criminal justice writ large, 
particularly when most criminal law takes place at the state, rather than federal, level. Still, it is 
remarkable that there was large bipartisan and public support for this bill, which bodes well for the 
prospects of further reform in coming years. 
6. For example, the number of people serving life sentences in prisons increased from 34,000 in 
1984 to 161,957 in 2016. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 8 
(2018), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/trends-in-u-s-corrections.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GZS7-T2FE]. And thanks to the War on Drugs, not only has the number of people 
incarcerated for nonviolent substance-related offenses increased, but the length of incarceration has also 
increased: “in 1986, people released after serving time for a federal drug offense had spent an average 
of 22 months in prison. By 2004, people convicted on federal drug offenses were expected to serve 
almost three times that length: 62 months in prison.” Id. at 3. The total number of individuals 
incarcerated in state and federal prisons and jails for drug offenses in 1980 was 40,900; in 2017, the 
number had ballooned to 452,900. Id. 
7.  For example, “African Americans are incarcerated in state prisons at a rate that is 5.1 times 
the imprisonment [rate] of whites”; the figure is 1.4:1 for Latinos. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3 (2016), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/ color-of-justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-
prisons.pdf [https://perma.cc/XY52-6QQT0]. The comparison is even more dismal in five states, which 
have a black-to-white incarceration rate of over 10:1. Id. at 8. 
8. Stuntz, supra note 2, at 508. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/6
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criminal law.9 Indeed, there are reasons to think that, in the legal world, 
practice is (sometimes) informed by good theory. For example, judges must 
give reasons for their decisions; at the highest levels, this requires doing 
more than simply following the courts’ own precedents or the will of the 
legislature. Theory is also important in legal systems where a single 
document purports to answer fundamental legal questions: constitutions are, 
arguably, incarnations of (strands of) political theories endorsed by their 
authors. Finally, it is at least sometimes the case that “jurisprudence is the 
way lawyers and judges reflect on what they do and what their role is within 
society.”10 Such reflection may be uncommon, but it is desirable. So while 
we should not overstate the importance of theory to the actual practice of 
law, I proceed under the assumption that normative legal philosophy is not 
merely an idle intellectual pursuit.11 
 My goal in this paper, then, is, first, to provide an answer to the 
question of what constitutes a compelling theory of criminalization and, 
second, to suggest what we can do to mitigate the problem of 
overcriminalization. My contention is that a theory of criminalization 
derived from Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy will provide these 
answers. Legal scholars in particular might wonder why we should seek a 
Kantian theory instead of an alternative. While I cannot provide a full 
defense of Kantian political thought here, I aim to show in the subsequent 
discussion that Kant provides us with both a compelling theoretical 
grounding for the criminalization question, and some satisfying (if 
surprising) practical results when applied to the problem of 
overcriminalization. 
 
 
 
9. HUSAK, supra note 1, at 3. Of course, it is conceivable that the “right” theory of criminal 
law would not solve the problem of overcriminalization that Husak identifies—at least not in the way 
that Husak desires. But since many scholars of criminal law seem to agree that there is too much of it, it 
seems reasonable to expect that one of the things that a good criminal law theory will do is limit its 
expansion. And even in the unlikely event that it turns out that the criminal law should expand 
exponentially, at least in that case we would have a good argument against the widely shared intuitions 
that too many possible human actions are presently defined as crimes, and that people who are convicted 
as criminals are punished too severely. 
10. BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT viii (8th ed. 2009). 
11. But for an argument against the proposition that normative theory is of practical value, see 
Stuntz, supra note 2, at 507-12 (asserting, inter alia, that “legislators who vote on criminal statutes 
appear to be uninterested in normative arguments”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. KANT’S POLITICAL THEORY 
The purpose of this section is to present Kant’s political theory in a way 
that will be most useful for the subsequent discussion of criminalization. 
Kant’s theory of justice can be described as having two main goals: (1) 
providing an account of civic freedom, and (2) describing the ideal roles of 
virtuous citizens within a political community. For the purposes of this 
analysis, we shall be concerned with only the first of these. 
Painting a complete picture of Kant’s theory of justice does, however, 
require a preliminary sketch of Kant’s overarching normative project and, 
in particular, requires explaining the relationship between justice and 
morality in Kantian thought. This shall be the task in subsection A below. I 
shall then turn to the question of civic freedom in subsection B. 
Before proceeding, I should make a preliminary comment about 
methodology. While I proceed largely exegetically, I deviate from Kant’s 
theory where reasonable. My goal is not to adhere strictly to Kant’s thought, 
but rather to take Kant’s approach, and many of his grounding assumptions, 
as generally persuasive. I do not hesitate, however, to modify as needed 
portions of his theory which seem contradictory or problematic—and I 
indulge in charitable interpretation which may at times wrest from the text 
meanings or conclusions that may not have been intended by Kant himself. 
In short, my approach is a Kantian one, but not one Kant himself would 
necessarily endorse in its entirety. 
A. Relationship Between Justice and Morality. 
Some versions of liberal thought insist on a rigid separation between 
civic justice and personal morality. This approach can be attractive, because 
it acknowledges the myriad “conceptions of the good” held by citizens in a 
pluralistic society.12 On such a view, the government should remain largely 
agnostic about the ends citizens choose for themselves while also ensuring 
that they have opportunities to attain those ends.13 Many liberal theorists 
 
 
 12. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 13. The precise content of such “opportunities” differs significantly, of course, between liberal 
theorists—a prominent example is the disagreement between John Rawls and Robert Nozick about the 
extent to which the government ought to redistribute socioeconomic resources in order to foster fair, 
rather than merely formal, equality of opportunity. Compare id. at 57-73, with ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 167-74 (1974). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/6
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seem to assume that justice in fact requires this kind of moral agnosticism.14 
There is certainly something right about this approach. It is important 
for a liberal society to leave room for, and recognize the existence of, 
different (and often competing) claims about values. We certainly desire a 
society where people with different life plans, and even very different 
conceptions of what constitutes morality, can express their ideas and 
flourish as individuals while maintaining a desirable level of social 
cooperation.15 Still, we can sometimes overstate the extent to which our 
political life is—or ought to be—separate or separable from our moral life. 
The accommodation of varying conceptions of the good does not entail that 
we must deny any connection whatsoever between morality and justice. 
Kant seeks to clarify the relationship between morality and justice by 
considering these concepts as pieces of a larger normative puzzle. “What 
must I do?” is a question that one poses oneself as an autonomous moral 
agent in some cases, and as a citizen of a polity in others. Kant’s claim is 
not that the answers to these questions will necessarily be identical in the 
moral and political contexts, but that our method for going about finding 
such answers will be similar and that the answers will stand in a logical 
relationship to each other.  
To explain the relationship between personal morality and public 
justice, Kant identifies three categories of laws: moral laws (or “laws of 
freedom”), ethical laws, and juridical laws.16 The latter two are subsets of 
 
 
14. For example, Rawls believes that justice requires recognizing that human beings have  
their own plans of life. These plans, or conceptions of the good, lead them to have different 
ends and purposes, and to make conflicting claims on the natural and social resources available 
. . . . As a consequence, individuals not only have different plans of life but there exists a 
diversity of philosophical and religious belief, and of political and social doctrines.  
RAWLS, supra note 12, at 110. Note that, just as embracing theological agnosticism would not entail an 
acceptance of any kind of God (one could be an agnostic who is certain that, whatever else God is, God 
must be just), this kind of moral agnosticism does not entail that one must accept without limitation any 
conception of the good whatsoever. Rawls’s discussion of the “priority of justice”—that is, the notion 
that justice imposes certain “restrictions” or “bounds” on individual conceptions of the good—is 
instructive in this context. Id. at 27-28. Nevertheless, the Rawlsian view (consistent with liberal theory 
more generally) still insists on a fairly rigid distinction between public justice and personal morality. 
15. See the introductory discussion in RAWLS, supra note 12, at 3-6, characterizing society as 
“a cooperative venture for mutual advantage”; he sees “social cooperation” as a desideratum of civic 
life, even “[a]mong individuals with disparate aims and purposes.” 
16. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 14 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) 
(6:214). Here and in subsequent notes I give the Akademie pagination, which is included in all modern 
translations of Kant’s works, in parentheses following the regular citation. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the former.17 Juridical laws, as we might imagine, determine the legality of 
a particular act. To act in a way that comports with juridical laws is to act 
so that our “external” actions “conform” to the law.18 Note, though, that 
“legality” here does not correspond necessarily to positive law, but only to 
laws which are rationally required—what some might term “natural law.” 
By contrast, when we act in the “ethical” realm, we are talking about the 
(personal) morality of an action.19 To act in such a way that comports with 
ethical laws is to act according to the proper “determining grounds of [our] 
actions”20 or, as moral theorists like to say, acting for the “right reasons.” 
By contrast, acting in accordance with juridical laws entails acting merely 
in compliance with the external rule at issue (which may or may not be for 
the morally right reasons).  
So, while Kant distinguishes “juridical” law from “ethical” morality, he 
does not separate them entirely. They are both subsets of morality in the 
broadest sense—that is, both our juridical and ethical obligations can be 
traced to our status as free and rational moral agents, and it is this status 
which in turn allows us to determine what precisely those obligations are. 
Moreover, acting morally entails acting legally—at least under ideal 
conditions21—because by exercising one’s external and internal use of 
choice according to the demands of reason, one has necessarily exercised 
one’s external use of choice in the proper way. As an example, I could act 
legally (i.e., juridically) by refraining from murdering you for any reason 
whatsoever, so long as my external choice (not murdering) conformed to 
the (juridical) law. But to act morally demands more: I must also ensure that 
the “determining grounds” of my action (not murdering) comport with the 
demands of the ethical law (which I can test using the various formulations 
 
 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. I mean “morality” in the everyday use of the term. There may be some confusion here, 
because Kant seems to use the term “moral” differently than we might—for any normative rule derived 
from reason. Thus Kantian “morality” comprises both morality in the everyday sense (what we ought to 
do, qua persons, morally speaking—which Kant later calls Virtue) and also what we might tem justice 
(that which is right to do in our political life—which Kant calls “juridical” laws or “right” (Recht)). 
20. KANT, supra note 16, at 14 (6:214). 
21. In less-than-ideal conditions, this may not be the case, because positive (juridical) law 
could be severed from the moral law. Under Nazi law, for example, one would have a moral obligation 
to act illegally. But where juridical laws are not immoral, conformity to “ethical” laws entails conformity 
to “juridical” ones. There will be closer cases, of course: positive laws might be unjust but not so clearly 
immoral as those characterizing the Nazi regime. But we need not worry about such cases for the 
moment: it is sufficient to realize that if our juridical laws in fact comply with the overarching laws of 
freedom, then we have an obligation to comply with them. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/6
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of the categorical imperative explained in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals).22 Of course, if I refrain from murdering you for the 
correct “internal” moral reasons (because such a law is universalizable, 
because doing so respects your humanity, and so forth), then I will 
necessarily also have complied with the juridical law in the external use of 
my choice (because ideal external laws forbid murder). 
Also of note here is that the ultimate source of any particular moral law 
(ethical or juridical) is human reason. Reason allows us to discover moral 
laws as surely as it enables the discovery of the laws of nature. The 
difference is that the laws of nature rely on empirical observations, while 
the laws of freedom rely on reason alone—they are “pure rational” 
concepts.23 Still, both areas of human endeavor result in the discovery of 
laws. Laws of nature are mandated by the features of the natural world—
because of the way the world is, we cannot defy the law of gravity without 
stepping outside our physical universe. Laws of freedom derive from the 
features of rational moral agents: we cannot defy the law of freedom without 
losing our place in our moral universe. This is why Kant asserts that we can 
only be free by subjecting ourselves to the moral law. Kantian freedom 
comes by choosing to constrain ourselves in such a way that we comply 
with the demands of morality, not from having no moral constraints on our 
conduct. We are free, in this sense, when we exercise autonomy of will 
rather than permitting our acts to be determined by causes external to our 
reason. Such a freedom ultimately entails, not just following the moral law, 
but internalizing it. We choose to put ourselves under the authority of the 
moral law, and in such commitment is true moral freedom attained.24 
 
 
22. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS in 
IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 37-108 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996). Specifically, 
see id. at 57 (4:402), 73 (4:421) for the Formula of Universal Law (“I ought never to act except in such 
a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law”); id. at 80 (4:429) for the 
Formula of Humanity (“So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”); id. at 81 (4:431) for the Formula 
of Autonomy (“[T]he idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law”); and id. at 
83 (4:433) for the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends (“A rational being must always regard himself as 
lawgiving in a kingdom of ends when he gives universal laws in it but is also himself subject to these 
laws”). I do not take a position here on whether Kant’s several formulae are equivalent, or even whether 
any of them correctly capture the set of conditions that constitute a morally right act. The important point 
for present purposes is that a morally right act must be performed for the right reasons (whatever those 
reasons turn out to be), whereas a juridically right one need not be. 
23. See, e.g., KANT, supra note 16, at 14 (6:221). 
24. Thus, Kant says that “the greatest perfection of a human being is to do his duty from duty 
(for the [moral] law to be not only the rule but also the incentive of his actions).” KANT, supra note 16, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
   
 
 
 
 
 
36 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 12:1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Civic Freedom 
Having established that personal morality (virtue) and public morality 
(justice) are concepts related by their derivation from the laws of freedom 
(discoverable through our status as rational moral agents), we are in a better 
position to understand Kant’s reasoning about the requirements of justice.  
Kant’s theory of justice is most clearly developed in a section of the 
Metaphysics of Morals called the Rechtslehre, or Doctrine of Right. Of 
particular importance here will be the subsection of the Doctrine of Right 
entitled “Public Right,” which describes citizens’ rights and duties in the 
context of civil society.25 In contemporary terms, we might say this section 
represents an attempt to describe the necessary features of the “basic 
structure”26 that a political society must have in order to constitute a just 
regime. We must keep in mind, in doing so, that Kant views the demands of 
justice as taking the form of rational laws. Thus he defines the Doctrine of 
Right as “[t]he sum of those laws for which an external lawgiving is 
possible.”27 Again, the term “law” does not refer to positive law, where 
“there has actually been such [external] lawgiving,”28 but to juridical laws, 
which are one form of lawlike commands of reason.29 Moreover, Kant does 
not intend to begin by answering specific questions about justice or morality 
but, rather, to elucidate foundational principles that will, eventually, help us 
address such questions.30  
In order to understand Kant’s conception of civic freedom within the 
Rechtslehre, we first need to understand what he intends by the term Recht. 
Kant says that this concept is one which satisfies the following conditions:  
(A) It “has to do, first, only with the external and indeed practical 
relation” between human beings “insofar as their actions . . . can have 
(direct or indirect) influence on each other.” 
 
 
at 155 (6:392) (emphasis in original). On the difference between ethical and juridical lawgiving, see id. 
at 21 (6:219). And on the “self-constraining” nature of ethical duties, see id. at 148 (6:383). 
25. Id. at 89-113 (6:311-6:342). 
26. RAWLS, supra note 12, at 7. 
27. KANT, supra note 16, at 23 (6:229). 
28. Id. 
29. The Doctrine of Right is further contrasted here with laws which are strictly “internal”—
i.e. those moral laws which will be at issue in the Tugendlehre, or Doctrine of Virtue—the other main 
section of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
30. Thus “the application of these principles to cases the system itself cannot be expected [to 
address], but only approximation to it.” KANT, supra note 16, at 3 (6:205). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/6
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(B) It “signif[ies] . . . a relation to the other’s choice” and not 
another’s “mere wish” or “mere need.” 
(C) Finally, “[a]ll that is in question is the form in the relation of 
choice” and not “the matter of choice, that is, of the end each has in 
mind with the object he wants.”31 
Condition (A) initially posits that justice (Recht) is a relevant concept 
when considering the formal, external relations between people living 
closely enough together that their actions influence each other. This 
uncontroversial claim is supplemented by two others (still under (A)) that 
merit closer attention. First, justice is not concerned directly with people’s 
internal feelings about one another. Second, it is likewise not concerned 
with the relationship between people and non-rational entities.  
On its face, the first claim may seem too strong. But the claim is not 
that people’s feelings about others will always be irrelevant to justice. 
Indeed, Kant would say that good citizens should be disposed to regard their 
fellow-citizens in certain ways, which requires cultivating certain attitudes 
toward them.32 But it is still right to assert that I can behave justly, in a 
formal sense, without having those feelings or attributes on any particular 
occasion, even if they are conducive to just behavior. For example, I do not 
violate the demands of justice if I merely harbor a private loathing of you or 
your ilk (though I might violate a principle of personal morality in doing 
so); but this assertion is compatible with the observation that I am more 
likely to be the kind of person who acts justly if I in fact attempt to overcome 
these feelings and regard you in a more positive way. 
The second claim—justice is not concerned with the relationship 
between people and non-rational entities—appears plausible insofar as it 
entails that justice does not concern itself with, say, people’s aesthetic 
values (except derivatively, as when I unreasonably prevent you from 
pursuing a desired art form). But it also appears to preclude concern for 
human-to-animal relationships, or human-to-environment relationships, as 
matters of justice. Here we confront an unfortunate feature of Kantian 
thought more generally: it does not appear to accommodate the notion of 
 
 
31. Id. at 23-24 (6:230) (emphases removed). 
32. For an example of how this principle might be applied in the criminal justice context, see 
Sarah Holtman, Kant, Retributivism, and Civic Respect, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND 
POLICY 107 (Mark D. White ed., 2011). 
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valuing non-human animals, or the natural world more generally—at least 
not for their own sake, rather than for their potential impact on human 
beings.33 While we might normally be justified in noting this weakness and 
moving on, it presents a real problem in the present context, because 
criminal justice is sometimes thought to properly concern itself with such 
relationships. For example, we need to determine whether we ought to 
criminalize conduct which does not harm other humans directly, but which 
harms other sentient beings (e.g. treating animals cruelly), or which harms 
the natural world (e.g. polluting a river).  
I will tackle these questions in §III below. As a preview, however, I will 
suggest that the criminal law should rightly focus on a certain subset of 
wrongful interactions between human beings. Harms to animals or the 
natural world, however wrongful, fall outside the aegis of the criminal law.34 
If I am right, then this clause of condition (A) presents no particular problem 
for a Kantian theory of criminal justice. Whether justice (Recht), as opposed 
to morality more broadly, entails the proper treatment of animals or nature 
is a question I cannot hope to answer here. If so, then we would need to 
reject (A) or, more charitably, find a way of incorporating concern for non-
humans into it.35 
Condition (B) states that whatever duties arise from the Doctrine of 
Right will be directed toward others’ choices and not their wishes or needs. 
Attending to others’ desires may be laudable, and even required as a matter 
of morality—surely Kant does not think there is no moral difference 
between “beneficence or callousness.”36 His point is that, whatever we 
ought morally to do, the bar is significantly lower when we ask what is 
required by justice.  
A clarification is surely in order here, however, due to Kant’s use of the 
term “need” (Bedürfniß). If we are not to concern ourselves with others’ 
needs (as a matter of justice), then it would seem that justice would not 
 
 
33. Thus, Kant asserts that “beings without reason, still have only a relative worth, as means, 
and are therefore called things.” KANT, supra note 22, at 79 (4:428), emphasis in original. See also 
IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 212 (Peter Heath trans., Peter Heath & J.B. Schneewind ed., 
1997) (27:458). 
34. Except, that is, insofar as they implicate rights human beings have, as when someone 
wantonly pollutes land belonging to another. 
35. For two such attempts, see Lara Denis, Kant’s Conception of Duties Regarding Animals 
Reconstruction and Reconsideration, 17 HIST. OF PHIL. Q. 405 (2000) and Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Ideals of 
Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments, 5 ENVTL. ETHICS 211 (1983).  
36. KANT, supra note 16, at 24 (6:230). 
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require the provision of public education, welfare, health care, or any other 
purported social good—after all, these are “mere” needs. Yet many of us no 
doubt share the intuition that citizens ought to have the basic resources 
needed to make rational choices, and this seems very likely to include access 
to goods such as education, health care, and so on. 
One possibility is that Kant did not, in fact, intend his conception of 
civic freedom to move beyond what I will refer to below as “political” 
conditions of freedom. On this libertarian reading, justice requires us to 
refrain from interfering with others’ choices, but does not require us to assist 
others in attaining their desires. Thus, justice prevents me from interfering 
with your choice to vote for a particular presidential candidate but will not 
require that I (or the State) provide you with educational opportunities that 
would permit you to make an informed choice in the matter. 
A second possibility is that we should read “need” here as something 
like “perceived need” or “specific need.” Thus, it is a plausible 
interpretation of (B) that justice demands that we enable people to make 
rational choices—but we are not (again, as a matter of justice) required to 
enable them to attain any particular thing that they might want (or think that 
they need). On this view, citizens might have a right to a basic level of 
education (so that they could, among other things, make informed decisions 
about whom to vote for), though they would not have a right to attend any 
particular college that they wished. Again, we might think that citizens 
ought to have access to lifesaving and disease-preventing forms of 
healthcare, since health is necessary in order to make rational choices about 
the course of one’s life. The state need not, however, subsidize a person’s 
particular desire for cosmetic surgery, since this is (barring exceptional 
cases) not vital to the person’s ability to form and pursue his conception of 
the good (despite the fact that, in any particular case, such surgery might 
happen to be something he wishes he could choose, and even thinks he 
needs). 
Both of these interpretations seem plausible. The bare text would seem 
to support the more libertarian reading, but Kant’s broader commitments to 
citizen autonomy seem to argue in favor of the more liberal one. As this 
section will make clear, however, we need not decide which is the correct 
(or more compelling) interpretation for the purposes of our discussion about 
criminalization. 
Finally, condition (C) posits that justice is concerned only with the form 
and not the matter of choice. Kant’s example here is a commercial 
transaction. The Doctrine of Right does not inquire into whether the parties 
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to a transaction will “gain” in an objective sense, but merely whether the 
choice is a free one that accords with universal law. Again, we might worry 
about the possibility that commercial transactions will not be fair in many 
cases, despite their form being just. It is probable, though, that Kant has in 
mind contracts entered into by fully free and rational agents. In the situation 
where the contracting parties are aware of the ramifications of their choice, 
and the choice is free, then justice is not concerned with whether the 
transaction results in what looks like an objectively “fair” trade. All that 
matters is that the transaction was entered into freely.  
Once again, a simple example is instructive. Suppose I purchase two 
widgets at the store, that I was not coerced into doing so, that I knew what 
the widgets were, and that I had access to information about reasonable 
widget prices (and whatever other conditions we might imagine are 
necessary in order to classify my choice to purchase widgets as a free one). 
If I later decide that I do not, after all, want any widgets and attempt to undo 
the transaction by returning them to the store, then we surely would not say 
that it would be unjust for the storekeeper to refuse to accept my proffer of 
a return. It might be morally praiseworthy if she did so—and of course it 
might be in her best interest as a businessperson to provide this level of 
customer service—but it would not be unjust if she refused to buy back the 
widgets. The “form” of the widget transaction was fair and uncoerced. This 
is sufficient as a matter of justice, even if I spend the rest of my life 
regretting my widget purchase. 
Conditions (A), (B), and (C) are what we might call the formal 
constraints on the concept of Recht.37 They can help us identify questions 
that fall under the aegis of “juridical” law. The question then becomes—
how do we act justly? Justice, for Kant, is doing what is right “in accordance 
with external laws.”38 Since that which is right conforms to duty, and the 
external law is the “juridical” law, what Kant means is that justice is the 
duty to conform one’s actions to the requirements of ideal laws under 
conditions (A), (B), and (C). 
How, though, do we determine what such conformity entails in any 
given case? After Kant lists the criteria above, he concludes that “[r]ight is 
therefore the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be 
united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of 
 
 
37. Here I employ the language, though not content, of Rawls’s “formal constraints of the 
concept of right.” RAWLS, supra note 12, at 112-18. 
38. KANT, supra note 16, at 16 (6:224). 
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freedom.”39 This leads to the formulation of the Universal Principle of Right 
(“UPR”): “Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice 
of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal 
law.”40  
The UPR is the standard against which we can measure our social 
progress toward justice; it is a “universal criterion” we can use to determine 
whether an act is just or unjust, and it (similarly to the Categorical 
Imperative proposed in the Groundwork) is cognizable “in reason alone.”41 
In other words, Kant believes we will naturally arrive at the UPR if we think 
about what it means to act justly or unjustly. One might be skeptical about 
the UPR as the only possible principle of justice, but it provides a 
compelling starting point for thinking about criminal justice. In order to 
grasp its import fully, however, we need to determine what “freedom” 
means in this context. 
In order to answer this question, a brief foray into moral theory will be 
helpful. According to Kant, moral freedom is attained by acting via reason 
for the sake of moral duty alone, unconstrained by any motivations or 
influences extrinsic to the will. Being morally free entails many 
obligations—both to others and to oneself. Moral freedom has little to do 
with the absence of constraint; it is a concept that applies to the use of our 
will in making moral choices. I act freely (morally speaking) when I choose 
to conform my conduct, and my reasons for it, to the requirements of 
morality. I am not free to do anything I will; rather, I am free to will that 
which I ought to do. 
To be more specific, Kant distinguishes between two senses of moral 
freedom: “Freedom of choice is this independence from being determined 
by sensible impulses; this is the negative concept of freedom. The positive 
concept of freedom is that of the ability of pure reason to be itself 
practical.”42 Freedom in the “negative” sense thus refers to our choice to act 
by overcoming base desires. Human beings are free in this sense because 
they have the capacity to make moral choices. This is what distinguishes 
humans as a class from rocks, trees, and nonhuman sentient beings; 
nonhuman animals act on instinct and impulse and are therefore capable 
 
 
39. Id. at 24 (6:231). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 23 (6:230). 
42. Id. at 13 (6:213-14) (emphasis removed). 
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merely of “animal choice.”43 Freedom in the “positive” sense, meanwhile, 
refers to the capacity that human beings have for internalizing moral 
principles—that is, we can discover principles of morality using our reason, 
but we can also claim a kind of ownership of them. Thus, a child might 
“discover” that honesty is a requirement of morality. He might initially 
make the choice to behave honestly in a merely negative way: in order to 
please his mother, for example. Hopefully, though, he will eventually come 
to endorse the principle of honesty as his own. He will see honesty as 
morally required regardless of the outcome. And he will be disposed to act 
on a maxim of honesty for its own sake, not merely as a means to avoid 
punishment or garner approbation. 
This Kantian notion of freedom can be contrasted with a more 
libertarian one, in which freedom is characterized as the mere absence of 
constraint. Indeed, our commitment to being free often requires us to 
constrain our desires. To take a simple example, Kant warns against 
“[b]rutish excess in the use of food and drink,” which “restricts or exhausts 
our capacity to use them intelligently.”44 We are free to decide what to 
consume, but overconsumption of certain substances can impair our 
freedom.45 So according to the Kantian view, a commitment to avoiding 
gluttony—or certain psychotropic substances—is the very essence of 
human freedom. We free ourselves by committing ourselves to follow the 
constraints of the moral law. Such morally obligatory self-constraint may 
cause an onlooker to think that the morally upright Kantian is not free—but 
this is only because the onlooker has in mind a libertarian definition of 
freedom as the mere absence of constraint. Kant does not endorse this notion 
of freedom in his moral theory. 
  What does this have to do with freedom in the context of the 
Rechtslehre? As one might expect from someone who sees the entire 
normative universe as logically connected, Kant’s concept of civic freedom 
bears some important similarities to the concept of moral freedom. As one 
would expect, however, there are also important differences between these 
concepts. These differences exist because justice involves normative 
requirements that arise by virtue of living in political communities, whereas 
the normative requirements of morality exist simply by virtue of being a 
 
 
43. Id. at 13 (6:213). 
44. Id. at 180 (6:427). 
45. Kant specifically counsels against the use of “narcotics, such as opium and other vegetable 
products,” which “create a need to use the narcotics again and even to increase the amount.” Id. 
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competent moral agent. 
The clearest similarity between civic and moral freedom is that both 
require putting ourselves under law. In the moral context, we act freely 
when we choose to follow the internal moral law—the Categorical 
Imperative.46 In the political context, we are free when we choose to be 
subject to external laws which are just. In both cases, freedom is not merely 
the absence of coercion; rather, it entails choosing to be governed by a 
certain type of law. In the realm of morality, the self-subjection to the moral 
law allows us to be free from the “sensible impulses” external to our will 
that otherwise threaten to govern our conduct. In the civic sphere, being 
subject to the just laws of the polity ensures that we are free from having 
our choices governed by forces external to our person—that is, by other 
people’s wills.  
Here, then, we see an important distinction between moral and civic 
freedom: while one’s status as a morally free agent takes no account of 
others’ actions, civic freedom is attained in part through the absence of 
unnecessary restraint or coercive force by other parties, including the 
government. Thus a corollary to the UPR is that citizens (and the state) can 
only “use external constraint that can coexist with the freedom of everyone 
in accordance with universal laws.”47 I am coerced, morally, when I permit 
forces extrinsic to my will to influence my (moral) decision-making. By 
contrast, I am coerced, civilly, when another person (or government entity) 
interferes with my (not-necessarily-moral) decision-making.  
Civic freedom is thus importantly reciprocal in a way that moral 
freedom is not. I am morally free (or not) quite independently of your 
choices. But because freedom in the political context has to do with relations 
between people, it entails both that I have obligations toward other people 
and that they have such obligations toward me. To be free (civilly), others 
must not interfere with my choices, and I must not interfere with theirs.  
For example, suppose I am falsely imprisoned by corrupt government 
officials. I retain moral freedom despite my imprisonment. I can choose to 
treat other human beings I encounter with respect for their humanity, and I 
can endorse such respectful treatment as a requirement of morality. True, I 
might find it more difficult to act this way toward other people while I am 
languishing in prison—but I nonetheless retain the capacity to act morally. 
 
 
46. See KANT, supra note 22, at 88 (4:439-40), for Kant’s discussion of morality-qua-
lawgiving. 
47. KANT, supra note 16, at 25 (6:232). 
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By contrast, such a situation would constitute an obvious hindrance to my 
ability to make meaningful life choices about where to live, how to be 
employed, and what to do with my spare time. This diminished civic 
freedom is a direct result of others’ actions, while my moral freedom 
persists in spite of them. 
Thus, to the extent that scholars have interpreted Kantian civic freedom 
in a libertarian manner (as merely the absence of restraint or coercive 
force48), their view is incomplete. For Kant, civic freedom entails both 
making “free use of [my] choice” but also being bound by obligations 
toward others.49 Making free use of your choice does mean being able to 
choose your own ends: “nobody else gets to tell you what purposes to 
pursue; you would be their subject if they did.”50 Part of what Kantian 
freedom entails is therefore that the just society will be one in which all 
citizens are free from any type of formally coercive relationship—
relationships, such as those between slave and master, or suzerain and serf, 
which would prevent them from setting and pursuing ends they choose for 
themselves. But your freedom to pursue your ends is also “limited to those 
conditions” that permit others to exercise their freedoms.51 To live freely in 
civil society is thus to live in a state of mutual civic respect—that is, to 
respect everyone’s status as citizens and their concomitant claim to 
freedom—and also mutual accountability (the importance of which will 
become clear in Chapter 3). It is to presume that each is “innate[ly] equal[]” 
and capable of being his or her “own master.”52 It is to treat each other as 
“beyond reproach” (we should, in legal parlance, presume one another’s 
innocence) and as “being authorized to do to others anything” that does not 
violate the UPR (we interact with fellow citizens at will).53 These 
requirements go well beyond the mere avoidance of formal coercion. 
Such requirements will, of course, necessitate that I give up some of my 
ends: maiming you might help me achieve my desires but would be 
incompatible with your ability to do the same. But being “forced” by the 
principle of reciprocal freedom (instantiated by the UPR) to give up my ends 
 
 
48. See, e.g., Sharon B. Byrd, Kant’s Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, 
Retribution in its Execution, 8 L. & PHIL. 151, 153-54 (1989). 
49. KANT, supra note 16, at 24-25(6:231). 
50. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
34 (2009). 
51. KANT, supra note 16, at 24-25 (6:231). 
52. Id. at 30 (6:237-38). 
53. Id. at 30 (6:238). 
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is not the same as being “forced” by a dictator to do so. The forcefulness 
here is a matter of reason and morality, not physical or political power. And 
reasoning about the basic requirements of a just society leads to the 
conclusion that civic freedom requires that my ends be restricted to those 
which are compatible with yours, and vice-versa.54  
Finally, we can distinguish between negative and positive aspects of 
civic freedom, just as Kant explicitly does with moral freedom. In its 
negative mode, civic freedom entails being unconstrained by others’ wills. 
In its positive mode, it entails that citizens internalize the Universal 
Principle of Justice: they see themselves as under an obligation to act in 
such a way that is compatible with others’ freedom, and they become 
disposed to act this way even if they have personal incentives to the 
contrary.55 Libertarian interpreters of Kant correctly characterize the former 
aspect of civic freedom but pay insufficient attention to the latter. 
To summarize, we have seen that Kant has some formal criteria that 
purport to separate the concept of justice from that of personal morality. Yet 
acting justly does not normally require recourse to such conceptual analysis. 
Rather, we can determine what justice requires in much the same way that 
we can tell what morality requires: by appealing to the rational grounds of 
any juridical law, which is the Universal Principle of Right. The UPR holds 
that a just act is an exercise of freedom compatible with others’ freedom. 
Civic freedom, for Kant, is thus a reciprocal commitment. I am free, 
politically speaking, when I submit to the authority of just laws, and such 
laws, by virtue of being just, will accord all other citizens the same freedom 
to act. Logically, there are a great many acts which comply with the UPR: 
justice sets certain limits on the way that I act, but still permits a practically 
infinite combination of choices and acts that form what contemporary 
liberal theorists refer to as one’s “life plan.” 
Here, though, we face an important question about the scope or extent 
of Kant’s notion of civic freedom. It is clear that civic freedom requires that 
 
 
54. This insight may motivate the formulation of Rawls’ first principle of justice: “equal basic 
liberties” must be “compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.” RAWLS, supra note 12, at 
53, 266. 
55. This is likely what Kant refers to as civic independence. Independent citizens see 
themselves as “colegislators” of “a public law that determines for everyone what is to be rightfully 
permitted or forbidden him”; this law is “the act of a public will . . . of the entire people (since all decide 
about all, hence each about himself).” Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct 
in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice, in IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 294-95 (Mary 
J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (8:294). 
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I not be “hindered” in the pursuit of my ends. But what characterizes such 
hindrances? Are they to be construed merely as others’ choices? Or should 
we also consider other factors, such as social conditions which might 
prevent people from pursuing their conceptions of the good? For example, 
it is clear that it would be unjust for me to prevent you from applying for a 
job by kidnapping you. But what if your inability to obtain the job in 
question is due to systemic racial discrimination? Or what if, through no 
fault of your own, you had no access to educational opportunities that would 
enable you to compete for this kind of employment? 
It would be fruitful at this point to distinguish between different types 
of conditions that might be said to contribute to people’s autonomy within 
society—that is, to their civic freedom. First, rational moral agency is 
required for people to be considered autonomous. Thus, children and those 
with severe mental impairments cannot enjoy all the benefits—nor can they 
be expected to bear all the burdens—of citizenship. Next, there are what we 
might call political conditions of freedom: citizens must be treated equally 
under the law; must enjoy a reasonable level of security; and must be 
afforded certain basic rights. Those rights will include the freedom from 
interference with bodily integrity (which includes the right not to be 
deprived of life or liberty unjustly); the freedom from interference with 
political, religious, or other types of expressive choices; and the freedom 
from interference with the possession, acquisition, and use of private 
property.56 These rights are necessary for citizens to be able to set and 
pursue their own conceptions of the good. They may not, however, be 
sufficient. We may wish to add a second category of positive rights (the 
social conditions of civic freedom), such as rights to affordable healthcare, 
a minimum standard of living (or particular share of society’s resources), 
and educational opportunities. It is quite plausible to think that these social 
conditions are also necessary in order for citizens to make free choices about 
the course of their lives within civil society.57  
 
 
56. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive, though these are commonly cited examples. See 
Rawls’s list of “basic liberties” for a cognate view. RAWLS, supra note 12, at 53. His discussion of the 
“concept of liberty” is also useful. Id. at 176-80. The political conditions will consist mainly of negative, 
civil rights, such as those found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3-21; it will exclude 
many positive economic or social rights, such as those in art. 22-27. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (1948), http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ 
[https://perma.cc/9BHD-3G97]. These would be classified among the social conditions of civic freedom. 
57. Rawls thus includes them in his list of “primary goods.” RAWLS, supra note 12, at 54-55. 
It may be that Rawls is correct that what I am calling social conditions are of secondary importance to 
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Libertarian interpreters have thought that Kant, a “classical liberal,”58 
would endorse a minimalistic social order characterized by a paucity of 
government interference in citizens’ lives.59 On this view, Kant intended 
civic freedom to include what I have called the political conditions for civic 
freedom, but not the social conditions—which will, after all, typically 
require a greater governmental role for the provision of social services. As 
I have already noted, there is some textual evidence that this is in fact the 
view that Kant held. However, a thoughtful analysis of the requirements of 
civic freedom seems likely to yield the conclusion (regardless of whether or 
not Kant himself reached it) that the capacity to exercise my civic freedom 
will require some minimally satisfactory life conditions of the kind 
guaranteed by the social conditions. Nobody can seriously be thought to be 
free to pursue their own conception of the good when starving, dying from 
preventable disease, or subject to significant and pervasive discrimination 
by a large sector of their society. Thus, civic freedom will likely entail the 
provision of certain social services designed to preserve (among other 
possibilities) citizens’ health, economic wellbeing, and social standing. We 
may wish to go even further: perhaps civic freedom ultimately requires a 
more equitable distribution of resources than found in most contemporary 
societies, such as Rawls proposes under his Second Principle.60  
While I believe a compelling interpretation of Kantian freedom would, 
indeed, require us to recognize the substantive social conditions noted 
above, I shall not endeavor to make such an argument here. It will be 
sufficient for our purposes to note that Kantian civic freedom at least entails 
that I refrain from actions which would result in the violation of the political 
conditions of civic freedom. This is because the purpose of the criminal law 
(or so I will argue) is to preserve the formal “relation[s] of choice”61 that 
characterize human interactions within the “rightful condition”62 of a just 
society. In other words, the preservation of these political conditions is 
 
 
the political conditions—which is why he asserts that basic liberties cannot be sacrificed in the name of 
socioeconomic gains. Id. at 53-54. My goal here, however, is merely to call attention to the fact that 
civic freedom in its fullest sense may require the addition of these social conditions.  
58. See, e.g., Roger Sullivan’s introductory essay to an extant edition of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, asserting that “Kant represented classical liberalism and its attack on what remained of 
feudalism.” Introduction, KANT, supra note 16, at xiii. 
59. See generally Byrd, supra note 48; Don E. Scheid, Kant’s Retributivism, 93 ETHICS 262 
(1983).  
60. RAWLS, supra note 12, at 65-73. 
61. KANT, supra note 16, at 24 (6:230). 
62. Id. at 89 (6:311). 
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necessary for civic freedom. Whether it is sufficient is a larger question that 
I will leave for another day—though I suspect it is not. So, while a full 
discussion of Kantian justice would require delving into issues such as the 
ethics of resource inequality, this is beyond the scope of this project. It is 
sufficient for present purposes to understand that an ideally just society will 
at least be one in which citizens are free as a formal, political matter to 
pursue their ends, subject to the requirement that they comply with the UPR.  
II. A KANTIAN THEORY OF CRIMINALIZATION 
In this section, I present the Kantian theory of criminalization that is the 
main purpose of this paper. In doing so, I will focus on answering the 
following question: what kinds of acts ought to be criminalized? Before 
proceeding, though, it is worth noting that there is another significant 
question relevant to the topic of criminalization: who ought to be doing the 
criminalizing? I shall address this latter issue only briefly before turning to 
the former. 
In the Rechtslehre, Kant avers that “legislative authority can belong 
only to the united will of the people.”63 The claim here is not that positive 
law can never be rendered (in the real world) in the absence of unanimity 
among voters. Rather, the idea is that just legislation (political authority 
exercised in its pure form) necessarily arises from laws that citizens would 
give themselves, when acting in a way intended to preserve one another’s 
freedom, equality, and independence.64 Of course, no legislative system 
actually succeeds in passing all and only just laws. But where just laws do 
exist, they can rightly be characterized as decisions of “free and equal, co-
legislating member[s] of the state.”65  
It seems, then, that criminal laws in a just Kantian society could only be 
passed by legislative bodies either composed of or at least representing all 
citizens. An executive cannot make a unilateral decision to criminalize 
particular conduct, nor can a judge determine that a law is enforceable via 
criminal penalties—unless the legislature has not specified this beforehand, 
and the executive or judge succeeds in acting on behalf of the united will. 
Thus, as Kant put it, one governmental “authority” cannot justly “usurp 
 
 
63. Id. at 91 (6:313). 
64. Id. at 91 (6:314). 
65. PAULINE KLEINGELD, KANT AND COSMOPOLITANISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAL OF 
WORLD CITIZENSHIP 30 (2012). 
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[the] function” of another.66 
On the face of it, this seems sensible—but upon reflection things are not 
quite so simple. Laws often fail to provide sufficient specificity to easily 
determine every case. Judges are therefore often required in the course of 
their duties to interpret statutes passed by the legislative body. But doing 
this sometimes requires the exercise of what at least appears to be a 
lawmaking function.  
For example, a domestic-violence statute might criminalize violence 
against “family members.” What constitutes a “family member” might be 
obvious in some cases, such as when the victim is the defendant’s biological 
child and lives with him. In other cases, however, the answer may not be 
obvious: what about a non-married and non-cohabitating couple who have 
been romantically involved for years? What about a case involving a victim 
biologically related to the defendant, where the two have never lived 
together and were unaware of their relationship at the time of the offense? 
Of course, it would be helpful if the legislature would specify what 
constitutes a “family member,” but there is no guarantee that they will do 
so—and even if they try their best, it is inevitable that courts will be faced 
with ambiguities at some point. But if the legislature fails to specify what 
constitutes a “family member,” then either the jury must make this 
determination on a case-by-case basis, or judges must issue an interpretation 
binding on subsequent cases. Leaving such decisions up to the jury in every 
case invites inconsistency. Permitting judges to make rules makes sense in 
these kinds of cases—but this seems to violate Kant’s anti-usurpation 
clause. 
Indeed, Kant’s view of judging may be too limited. He sees the role of 
the “judicial authority” as simply “award[ing] to each what is his in 
accordance with the law,” or rendering a “verdict (sentence)[ as to] what is 
laid down as right in the case at hand.”67 Given human nature and the 
imprecision of human language, it is inconceivable that the judiciary will 
never be called upon to exercise a kind of lawmaking function, at least in 
the limited, and very routine, sense of “filling in the gaps” in legislation. 
Still, an expansion of the judicial function in this sense does not seem 
contrary to the spirit of Kantian lawmaking: so long as judges are attempting 
to discern the will of the legislature and limit their role to making reasonable 
 
 
66. KANT, supra note 16, at 93 (6:316). 
67. Id. at 91 (6:313) (emphasis removed). 
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rules about how to implement the united will of the people—and, of course, 
assuming the legislature has the authority to change its mind if it 
disapproves of decisions made by the judiciary—then they do not 
impermissibly “usurp” the function of the legislature. 
The issue of who ought to be doing the criminalizing is not quite as 
simple as this, however. For example, if criminalization cannot justly occur 
in the absence of some (generally legislative) operation of the united will, 
then we must conclude that the judiciary cannot rightly exercise a 
lawmaking function (except perhaps insofar as it fills in the gaps in existing 
law). Yet there are certain cases where we have historically approved of the 
judicial genesis of crimes. The classic example here is Nuremburg. High-
ranking Nazis were prosecuted after World War II by an international 
tribunal, convicted of serious war crimes, and punished accordingly. The 
problem is that the acts in question, while morally reprehensible, were not 
designated as crimes prior to the trials. This creates an odd result: “[b]ecause 
their conduct was contrary to neither existing German nor international 
criminal law, at least some of these Nazi officials were legally innocent”—
yet many people find nothing untoward about punishing genocidal war 
criminals even in the absence of preexisting law criminalizing their 
conduct.68 
I suspect that Kantian theory could ultimately address such questions in 
a satisfactory manner. For now, however, I shall sidestep such 
complications by assuming that we have in place a system whereby acts can 
be designated as crimes in accordance with the united will via some kind of 
democratic legislative process. Given this background assumption, we can 
then safely turn to the more immediately important question: which acts 
should the legislature designate as crimes? To this end, I will propose (in 
subsection A) a Kantian definition of criminal acts. I will then (in subsection 
B) show how an application of this definition will result in a more favorable 
 
 
68. Christopher Wellman, The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment, 122 ETHICS 371, 388 
(2012). The contemporary German solution to this problem is noteworthy. In general, the maxim nullum 
crimen, nulla poena sine scripta lege (or, “no crime, no punishment without written law”) holds, but in 
“recent German history . . . one category of law [exists] that would stand outside [this requirement]: the 
demands of natural justice or natural law.” MICHAEL BOHLANDER, PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN CRIMINAL 
LAW 11 (2009). Thus, the ban on retroactivity does not apply to crimes such as genocide or war crimes. 
Id. at 26. Importantly, this exception to the general principle applies, not just to “natural crimes” which 
the state has failed to codify, but also to situations where the defendant has a “natural right” defense 
similarly uncodified. Id. at 13. Thus “[n]atural justice . . . should be seen as a kind of safety-valve in a 
legal system tending toward a positivistic approach.” Id.  
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approach to criminalization than the one currently taken in Anglo-American 
criminal justice systems. 
A. A Kantian Definition of Crime 
Kant’s only definition of a criminal act is terse: it is a “transgression of 
public law.”69 This initially sounds unhelpful—crimes surely cannot be the 
violation of any law, and the modifier “public” is ambiguous. We can make 
some progress, however, when we look at the way Kant describes some 
example offenses: “counterfeiting money . . . theft and robbery, and the like 
are public crimes, because they endanger the commonwealth and not just an 
individual person.”70 Now crimes such as theft surely do not “endanger the 
commonwealth” in the literal sense—however wrongful they might be, 
property offenses typically do not rise to the level of treason. So, what could 
Kant mean by using such a strong phrase?  
Recall that Kant’s conception of justice entails that citizens must refrain 
from those acts which deprive other citizens of their civic freedom. In a just 
society—one that is in what Kant calls a “rightful condition”71—the purpose 
of laws is to ensure the freedom of all citizens. When I violate a just law, I 
therefore violate others’ civic freedom. By subjecting others to my will, I 
will that my ends become their own. I thus act in pursuit of an end that is 
incompatible with others’ ends. But the wrongdoing here is not merely 
engaging in an activity that is incompatible with a specific end another 
holds—for we all hold ends that are, to some extent, incompatible with 
others’. Rather, the wrong at issue is acting in such a way that undermines 
the capacity that other citizens have by virtue of their citizenship of setting 
and pursuing their ends. It is for this reason that a crime “endangers the 
commonwealth,” and does not merely harm an individual (though it often 
does this as well). 
To put this more succinctly, the following definition is an initially 
plausible way of identifying criminal acts based on what we know about 
Kant’s views of justice: 
 
 
69. KANT, supra note 16, at 105 (6:331). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 89 (6:311). 
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C: φ is a crime iff72 φ interferes with another’s73 civic freedom.  
In other words, if A does something that deprives B of B’s ability to set 
and pursue B’s ends as a citizen, then A has committed a crime. Definition 
C captures quite a bit of paradigmatically criminal acts. Murder, rape, and 
other mala in se acts use coercive force in a manner that obviously deprives 
victims of their ability to enjoy their freedom. 
C is not specific enough, however, for there are at least two possible 
interpretations of it (as well as a third, which shall be dealt with shortly): 
C′: φ is a crime iff A’s commission of φ interferes with B’s pursuit of 
B’s ends.  
C′′: φ is a crime iff φ is an instance of Φ and Φ by its nature violates 
the political conditions that enable citizens to pursue their ends. 
It should be easy to see that C′ represents an overly broad definition of 
crime. Many activities that human beings undertake have the effect 
(intended or otherwise) of interfering with others’ ability to pursue their 
ends. For example, adopting C′ would imply that both economic and athletic 
competitions should be criminalized. After all, if I attract more customers 
with a superior product—or if I win a race by running faster—then I have 
interfered with others’ purposes. These activities should obviously not be 
considered crimes. C′ also has the problem of failing to criminalize acts 
which, while reprehensible, fortuitously fail to interfere with others’ pursuit 
of their ends. Thus, if A murders B, who was (unbeknownst to A) attempting 
suicide at the time, surely we would want to assert that A has committed a 
crime despite unintentionally aiding B’s pursuit of his goal. 
Definition C′′ better captures the Kantian view of criminal acts. I 
commit a crime if my act is of the kind that violates those formal, political 
conditions which enable the pursuit of ends by all citizens. (Recall that the 
political conditions of civic freedom include rights familiar to liberal 
democracies: freedom of speech, religion, and assembly; freedom of 
 
 
72. This notation is used in philosophical literature to stand for the biconditional “if and only 
if.” 
73. Here, as elsewhere in this paper, I assume that the criminal and victim are both citizens of 
the same polity, and that the offense takes place within that polity. A fuller account would need to explain 
why non-citizens who commit criminal acts can be justly prosecuted within the jurisdiction where the 
offense takes place, as well as why non-citizens are entitled to claim a violation of their civic freedom 
in the criminal context while not otherwise being entitled to exercise certain aspects of it (e.g. voting or 
receiving certain government benefits). For a brief discussion, see §III infra. 
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movement and association; a right to bodily integrity; and so on.) This 
definition is more complicated but avoids the problems in C′. For example, 
theft and other property crimes violate the condition of private property 
ownership that enables people to pursue their economic interests. (By 
contrast, fair economic competition on the Kantian view does not violate 
this condition.) Any assaultive crime (murder, rape, kidnapping, battery, 
and so on) violates the condition of freedom of bodily integrity that enables 
people to pursue the life they wish. Moreover, C′′ allows us to call the 
“lucky” murderer in the above example a criminal: although it turns out that 
B does not mind being killed, this particular killing is nonetheless an 
instance of the kinds of offenses which prevent citizens from using their 
lives as they see fit. 
Recall that one of part of the formal definition of Recht is that it “has to 
do, first, only with the external and indeed practical relations of one person 
to another.”74 These external relationships are governed by the UPR. What 
we have done in C′′, then, is simply apply this definition to the criminal law. 
Crimes are those acts which are incompatible with other citizens’ use of 
their civic freedom—not just because they are morally wrong, but because 
they are incompatible with the “sum of conditions”75 that characterizes a 
just society. 
We cannot be certain whether C′′ is precisely what Kant has in mind 
when he refers to crime as a “transgression of public law.” There is, 
however, at least one passage that lends credence to this interpretation. In 
discussing the proper method of punishment for thieves, Kant asserts that 
“[w]hoever steals makes the property of everyone else insecure and 
therefore deprives himself (by the principle of retribution) of security in any 
possible property.”76 Kant focuses here on punishment but, in doing so, he 
describes the crime of theft as the deprivation of security in any possible 
property (not just the taking of another’s property) and its effect as 
insecurity for everyone (not merely harm to the immediate victim’s 
interests). While the thief commits a moral wrong by harming his victim, 
the crime is the violation the condition of security in property that ensures 
all citizens’ rights to property ownership, rights that in turn are necessary in 
order for citizens to use their property as they see fit. 
This, then, can help us make sense of some common intuitions about 
 
 
74. KANT, supra note 16, at 24 (6:230). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 106 (6:333). 
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crimes versus wrongs. Theft is a paradigmatically criminal act. Breaking a 
promise to a friend, by contrast, is not. Breaking promises will, of course, 
be morally wrong in many circumstances. That I fail to uphold my promise 
may be emotionally devastating for you. It does not, however, violate any 
political conditions for citizens’ enjoyment of their freedom. Though 
saddened by my actions, you are still free to move about, act and think as 
you like, and develop your own life plan (which might now exclude my 
friendship!)—and so are all of our fellow-citizens. The “external” 
relationships among citizens have not been altered; we are all formally still 
free to go about our business, in a way that we are not if the system of 
property rights that underwrites our holdings has been violated (as in the 
case of theft). 
There is still one ambiguity to resolve here, however. Why should we 
not consider the following definition of a crime as superior to C′′? 
C′′′: φ is a crime iff φ is an instance of Φ and Φ by its nature violates 
the political or social conditions that enable citizens to pursue their 
ends. 
Our definition in C′′ proposes that crimes are those acts which are of the 
type that violate the political conditions enabling citizens to pursue their 
ends. But what about the social conditions? As discussed in §I, the social 
conditions include, among other possibilities, access to important public 
goods such as health care, education, and welfare. As noted in that section, 
it may be true that Kant himself saw justice (and, therefore, criminal justice) 
as limited mainly to the political conditions. That, though, is not a good 
enough reason for us to exclude the social conditions from our conception 
of justice, particularly where Kant’s notions of civic freedom and citizen 
autonomy seem to militate strongly in favor of including them. Therefore, 
we at least need to consider whether our definition of crimes should include 
violations of the social conditions. 
I believe, though, that we ought to favor C′′ over C′′′. The reason for 
this is not the libertarian rationale that matters such as people’s health, 
education, and economic status are outside the scope of justice. Rather, the 
reason is that they are outside the scope of criminal justice. Consider two 
different types of violations of civic freedom: 
V1: A kidnaps B, preventing B from attending a public school. 
V2: The government fails to provide B with access to a reasonable 
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level of public education otherwise available to all citizens. 
V1 is a paradigmatic criminal act. At first, V1 seems to be a violation of 
a social condition of civic freedom, because B’s educational opportunities 
are at stake. V1 can, however, be easily rephrased in a way that makes it 
clear that A has violated an even more fundamental, political condition of 
B’s freedom: by kidnapping B, A has violated B’s right to choose what to 
do with his life (which may include availing himself of educational 
opportunities). In the case of V2, we still ought to say that B has not been 
dealt with justly. But there are two crucial differences. First, the perpetrator 
of the ostensible crime is a nebulous entity—“the government”—rather than 
an identifiable citizen. There may be a sense in which everyone within B’s 
society is at fault for the failure to provide B with educational opportunities. 
But there is also a sense in which no one is at fault. This is not to minimize 
the problems that lack of educational opportunities could cause B. We 
should surely fight for B’s right to education—we should call upon 
government leaders to change policies, for example—and perhaps it would 
be right to demand that society compensate B for its failure to treat him 
equally with other citizens. But we cannot say, as we can with V1, that an 
identifiable person has done something to prevent B from exercising his 
freedom. 
This explains, in part, what motivates Kant’s claim that crime renders 
the criminal “unfit to be a citizen.”77 Because civic freedom is reciprocal, in 
violating another’s freedom, I thereby give up my own. This is quite 
intuitive for many prototypical crimes: surely the (fairly) convicted 
murderer has no grounds to complain that his rights are being violated if the 
court revokes his freedom of movement, for example, when he is sent to 
prison. The notion that the criminal loses certain rights of citizenship seems, 
however, impossible to square with the notion of crime as a violation of the 
social conditions of freedom. The failure of the United States to provide 
affordable healthcare to all citizens constitutes an injustice, but it is not one 
for which it is coherent to say that, for example, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services ought to lose her rights as a citizen. 
A further consideration is that social rights may be significantly more 
indeterminate than political rights. There will always be questions about 
what to do when political rights conflict (such as, for example, rights to 
security on the one hand and free speech on the other). But we can state with 
 
 
77. KANT, supra note 16, at 105 (6:331). 
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some confidence what these rights involve, and the tradeoffs involved when 
they conflict are obvious. On the other hand, social rights seem rather more 
difficult to explain and implement. Does it matter, in terms of justice, 
whether a country implements a single-payer health insurance system, or a 
more market-based solution such as the Affordable Care Act? Must public 
education be provided to all citizens through high school? Through college? 
If we accept that citizens are entitled to the provision of income 
guaranteeing a minimum standard of living, how do we determine what that 
level of income is? How do we even decide who should be in charge of 
making such a decision? These are, of course, important questions that merit 
attention within our society. The criminal justice system is not, however, a 
plausible forum in which to answer them.  
C′′′, then, goes too far. The criminal law sets a floor for civic freedom, 
not a ceiling. Justice requires that citizens comply with the UPR and, in 
doing so, refrain from violating the political conditions of others’ civic 
freedom. Such violations are rightly designated as criminal acts. This does 
not mean that a society free from crime will be perfectly just; a crime-free 
society still needs to work out how to guarantee that the social conditions 
for civic freedom are met for all citizens. 
We have almost, then, arrived at a convincing Kantian definition of 
crime. One matter still requires our attention, however, before we turn to 
the task of applying this definition to contemporary criminal codes. This is 
the question of what has come to be called in Anglo-American law mens 
rea.78 That is, to what extent does the state of mind of the alleged criminal 
matter in determining whether he has, in fact, committed a crime? 
As it stands, C′′ does not specify any mens rea requirement. Thus, it 
would appear that someone could be convicted of a crime even if he violated 
the political conditions of civic freedom accidentally. This, however, is 
implausible. It seems axiomatic that if I assault you, I am rightly called a 
criminal, but if I merely harm you accidentally, then I am not. But there are 
closer cases: what if I did not intend to harm you, but was insufficiently 
thoughtful (reckless or negligent, as lawyers put it) about the consequences 
of my action? We therefore need to add to C′′ some language about a 
putative criminal’s mental state. 
Kant does not provide much direct guidance about this issue; his focus 
 
 
78. Formally, mens rea is “[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must 
prove that a defendant had when committing a crime.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (2d pocket ed. 
2001). 
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is on the nature of the criminal act itself, rather than on the mental state of 
the criminal. Arthur Ripstein interprets Kant to mean that a criminal 
necessarily acts on a maxim of self-exemption from public law.79 This 
definition is too narrow, however, for reasons that shall become clear 
shortly. I propose, then, that order to qualify as a criminal act, we must be 
able to characterize the actor’s maxim as being incompatible with the 
Universal Principle of Right. 
A maxim specifies the reasons on which a person acts.80 In the case of 
many criminal acts, the criminal’s maxim is assumed within the definition 
of the crime. Thus, if Geoffrey intentionally kills Hugh because he wishes 
to obtain Hugh’s property, we use the term murder (rather than, say, 
accidental killing). In doing so, we implicitly attribute to Geoffrey a 
maxim—something like, “I will take another’s life in order to further my 
own purposes.” After all, if we could not attribute such a maxim to Geoffrey 
(that is, if we conclude that Geoffrey’s reasons for acting did not include 
intending to kill anyone), then we would not be dealing with the crime of 
murder at all. 
While this is a rather quotidian example of homicide, the maxim in 
question does not clearly involve (as Ripstein suggests it must) self-
exemption from public law. Whatever is going on in Geoffrey’s mind when 
he sets out to kill Hugh, it is unlikely to be related to the requirements of 
public law. Indeed, in virtually every case (with the possible exception of 
treason and similar acts against the state), it would be fatuous to assume that 
the criminal’s intent is circumventing the system of political conditions that 
underwrites citizens’ civic freedom. It would, however, be correct to 
characterize Geoffrey’s maxim, whatever it is, as being incompatible with 
the requirements of the UPR: Geoffrey chooses to act, for whatever purpose, 
 
 
79. RIPSTEIN, supra note 50, at 308-09. 
80. Kant himself explains a maxim as “the subjective principle of acting. . . .[which] contains 
the practical rule determined by reason conformably with the conditions of the subject . . . and is 
therefore the principle in accordance with which the subject acts.” KANT, supra note 22, at 73 (4:421), 
n.1. Kant avers that we can evaluate the moral worth of our maxim by comparing it with the moral law, 
which is “the objective principle valid for every rational being, and the principle in accordance with 
which we ought to act, i.e., an imperative.” Id. As an example, Kant suggests that a person in need of 
money might be tempted to borrow from another knowing that he will never repay the debt. “Supposing 
that he decided to do so, his maxim of action would go as follows: when I believe myself to be in need 
of money, I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen.” 
Id. at 74 (4:422). Kant demonstrates that this act would be incompatible with the moral law, because if 
everyone acted in this way, “no one would believe what was promised him.” Id. Thus the lying promise 
is immoral because “we take the liberty of making an exception to it [i.e. the moral law] for ourselves . 
. . to the advantage of our inclination.” Id. at 76 (4:424).  
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in such a way that precludes Hugh from exercising his own freedom. We 
can expect that Geoffrey, as a citizen, will be aware of this very basic 
requirement of justice and will conform his conduct accordingly. His failure 
to do so constitutes a criminal act. 
This kind of incompatibility does not, therefore, necessarily require that 
the criminal act with the intent to circumvent the UPR—indeed, it does not 
even require that the criminal’s act be intentional. While many of the mala 
in se can be characterized as having a mens rea requirement of 
intentionality, we can also expect citizens to act with a reasonable level of 
care when they interact with their fellow citizens. A failure to do so, while 
not rising to the level of intentional conduct, can also rightly constitute 
criminal behavior. 
Suppose, for example, that Geoffrey kills Hugh unintentionally, but as 
the result of reckless conduct: Geoffrey is driving carelessly and runs Hugh 
down, for example. The law might call such a case negligent homicide, 
rather than murder, to reflect the fact that Geoffrey’s act is different (and 
less heinous) than if he were to set out to act on a maxim of murder. But it 
is certainly right to say that driving so recklessly that one runs the risk of 
killing another person amounts to acting on a maxim (e.g. “In order to 
further my own enjoyment, I will drive however I feel like at the moment, 
without regard for rules or road conditions”) that is incompatible with 
others’ exercise of their freedom. It is, therefore, a criminal act. 
This case can be contrasted with a purely accidental vehicular collision 
that causes Hugh’s death. Perhaps Geoffrey is driving carefully, but Hugh 
is insufficiently cautious in crossing the street; or perhaps Geoffrey’s car 
malfunctions, and he is unable to stop in time. There are numerous ways in 
which Geoffrey could be a but-for cause of Hugh’s death, but where it 
would seem incorrect to label Geoffrey a criminal. This is because 
Geoffrey’s maxim could in such cases be characterized as something akin 
to the following: “In furthering my own ends, I will drive in such a way that 
takes others’ safety into consideration.” Geoffrey’s killing of Hugh under 
these circumstances would certainly be incompatible with Hugh’s exercise 
of his freedom. It would not, however, be a criminal act, because we could 
not attribute to Geoffrey a maxim incompatible with the UPR. 
There will, of course, be difficult cases. Perhaps Geoffrey was merely 
inattentive but not reckless. Perhaps Hugh was contributorily negligent in 
crossing the street. If Geoffrey were put on trial for vehicular homicide, the 
factfinder would still need to determine, in this particular case, how best to 
characterize Geoffrey’s act. What is clear, however, is that the Kantian view 
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could not countenance labeling Geoffrey a criminal unless it was rightly 
determined that his maxim, whatever it was, was incompatible with the 
UPR. 
Our final Kantian formulation of a criminal act is therefore as follows: 
C*: An act is a crime iff both (1) that act by its nature violates the 
political conditions that enable citizens to pursue their ends, and (2) 
the actor’s maxim is incompatible with the Universal Principle of 
Right. 
I now turn to the task of applying this definition to the criminal code.  
B. Applying the Definition 
In this subsection, I aim to show what it would mean for contemporary 
Anglo-American criminal codes if we subscribed to the Kantian definition 
of crime, C*, that we arrived at in the previous subsection. In order to do so, 
I will begin by describing some acts which will certainly be criminalized by 
the application of C*; I will then identify those which would not be 
criminalized under this definition. The results of this exercise are 
summarized in Table 1 following this paragraph, to which the reader may 
refer in the subsequent discussion.81 To be clear, I cannot hope to evaluate 
every criminal statute in every jurisdiction in the United States. Rather, I 
have selected a few examples of how the Kantian definition developed in 
the previous subsection could help us determine the appropriate scope of 
the criminal law. 
 
  
 
 
81. In this chart, I leave out obvious assumptions, such as that the conduct in question is not 
subject to legal excuse or justification. Moreover, the examples are not intended to be exhaustive, and it 
is quite possible that a single act will fall under multiple classes and will implicate multiple political 
conditions of freedom. It should also be noted that I leave a discussion of difficult cases that remain after 
the application of C* for a later section of this paper.  
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TABLE 1: CRIMINALIZATION SCHEME 
Class of Acts Examples Political Condition(s) of 
Freedom Violated 
Characterization 
of Criminal’s 
Maxim82 
Criminal 
-ize 
Physical harm 
to other people 
Murder, Rape, 
Assault, Abuse, 
Kidnapping 
This broad category may 
entail violations of one 
more basic rights, such 
as: 
 
Bodily Integrity: 
condition making it 
possible to do as one 
wishes with one’s body. 
 
Movement: condition 
making it possible to go 
where one wishes. 
 
Association: condition 
making it possible to 
associate with others of 
one’s choosing (for 
social, political, religious, 
or recreational purposes). 
 
I will harm 
another person in 
order to obtain 
something for 
myself. 
Yes 
Psychological 
harm to other 
people 
Stalking, 
Threatening, 
Harassment  
Security: condition 
making it possible to lead 
one’s life with a 
reasonable expectation of 
security consistent with 
that of other citizens, 
making it possible to 
exercise other rights and 
enjoy one’s civic 
freedom. 
 
I will cause others 
to fear for their 
safety, in order to 
satisfy my own 
desires. 
Yes. 
Property crimes Arson, Theft, 
Robbery, 
Burglary, 
Vandalism 
Private Property: 
condition making it 
possible to hold and use 
property as one desires. 
 
I will appropriate 
another’s property 
for my own 
purposes. 
Yes 
Criminal 
recklessness 
Manslaughter, 
Endangerment, 
Drive-by 
Shooting,  
Driving Under 
the Influence 
Varies, but typically 
bodily integrity as above. 
In order to further 
my own purposes, 
I will act in such a 
way that others 
cannot enjoy a 
reasonably safe 
community. 
Yes  
 
 
 
 
82. These maxims are, of course, vey general—they would need to be stated with more 
specificity based on the facts of the particular case at hand. 
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TABLE 1, CONTINUED 
Class of Acts Examples Political Condition(s) of 
Freedom Violated 
Characterization 
of Criminal’s 
Maxim 
Criminal 
-ize 
Regulatory 
(conduct 
toward 
government) 
Impersonating 
a police officer, 
Escape, 
Obstruction of 
Justice, Perjury 
Security: as above. 
 
 
To further my 
own ends, I will 
act in such a way 
that other citizens 
cannot be assured 
that the 
government is 
protecting their 
civic freedom. 
 
Yes 
Harm to the 
State or public 
Treason, Tax 
Evasion, Abuse 
of Office, 
Public 
Misconduct 
Well-Functioning State: 
condition making it 
possible to enjoy all other 
civic freedoms. 
I will act against 
the interests of all 
citizens in order to 
further my own 
purposes. 
Yes 
Regulatory 
(licensure) 
φ’ing without a 
license 
None. Such regulations 
are not required in order 
to ensure the political 
conditions of freedom. 
I will exempt 
myself from 
governmental 
regulations. 
No  
Harm to self Drug use, 
Suicide 
None. Self-harm violates 
moral but not civic 
freedom. 
I will harm myself 
in order to fulfill 
my own desires. 
No 
Possessory 
offenses 
Possession or 
Use of Drugs, 
Weapons, or 
Pornography 
 
None. No political 
conditions of freedom at 
issue. 
I will engage in 
risky or unseemly 
behavior in 
private. 
No 
Public 
nuisances 
Disorderly 
Conduct, 
Public Nudity, 
Public 
Drunkenness, 
Swearing, 
Littering,  
Leash-law 
violations 
None (as above). I will engage in 
behavior others 
consider 
obnoxious or 
immoral but 
which does not 
violate any 
political 
conditions of civic 
freedom. 
 
No 
Private 
immorality 
Adultery, 
Polygamy, 
Pornography. 
None (as above). I will engage in 
behavior 
condemned by 
others (but not 
violative of their 
civic freedom) for 
my own purposes. 
 
No 
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Two common categories of acts in modern criminal codes are harms to 
other people and harms to their property. These categories are extremely 
broad, and legislatures currently have no principled reason to keep any 
particular harm out of the criminal code, other than practical considerations 
about enforcement and, perhaps, a general sense of equity. The application 
of C*, however, allows us to assert that it is not any harm that will render 
an act susceptible to criminalization. Rather, the harm must be of the type 
that (1) violates political conditions enabling people to exercise their 
freedom and (2) is the result of acting on a maxim incompatible with the 
UPR. 
Applying this definition will lead us to conclude that the standard mala 
in se offenses are properly considered criminal acts. Assaultive offenses 
(rape, murder, battery, and so on) violate the condition of bodily integrity 
that is an obvious requirement of justice. Kidnapping or otherwise coercing 
people into actions against their will violates the freedom of movement that 
is also a condition of justice. Acts that do not cause physical harm but put 
people in fear of their safety (e.g., threatening or harassing) violate what we 
might call the condition of security: in a just society, people must feel 
reasonably able to go about their business without fear in order to enjoy 
their freedom. They may also frequently violate the condition of privacy 
that has a similar justification. Finally, impermissibly taking or damaging 
others’ property (such as in cases of theft, arson, etc.) violates the condition 
of private property. 83 
In all of these cases, the second condition of C* (that the actor’s maxim 
is incompatible with the UPR) is easily met. Since one cannot murder, 
assault, or rob someone unintentionally, it seems right to conclude that the 
actor’s maxim can be characterized as something like: “I will harm this 
person in order to obtain something for myself.” Again, this is not to say 
that the offender actually has such a maxim in mind—rather, it is to say that 
 
 
83. Kant assumes that private property rights are a necessary condition for a just social order. 
See, e.g., his discussion of property rights in KANT, supra note 16, at 49-56 (6:260-70). Though I am 
sympathetic to this view, I will grant that it might be possible to have a just society in which the notion 
of private property did not exist. This does not mean that property-related crimes are not necessarily 
crimes; rather, it means that, in such a case, the concept of theft would not exist—or would be modified 
to mean something like the “assertion of unilateral ownership over a piece of communal property.” If, 
in fact, such an assertion could reasonably be said to violate the political conditions of freedom of the 
society in question, then it would properly be considered a crime—the central wrong in both this case 
and in the standard theft case being something like “appropriating for oneself a thing which one is not 
entitled to appropriate.” 
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his actual intent, whatever it may be, will be incompatible with the UPR, 
and therefore reducible to this kind of maxim.  
The same will be true if the offender commits certain offenses with a 
mens rea of recklessness. For example, suppose someone acts with “willful 
and wanton disregard” for the life of others, and thereby causes another’s 
death.84 While manslaughter is less heinous than murder, it is still an act that 
is incompatible with the UPR. Reciprocal civic freedom demands that I take 
reasonable care in going about my business, and my failure to do so, 
resulting in another’s death, may be characterized as resulting from acting 
on a maxim along the following lines: “In order to attain my own desires, I 
will fail to act in a reasonably careful way.” A similar analysis underwrites 
the criminalization of many kinds of criminally reckless behaviors of 
varying degrees of dangerousness, from drive-by shooting to driving under 
the influence. These kinds of acts all manifest, to varying degrees, that the 
offender acts without sufficient regard for the civic freedom of his fellow 
citizens. 
While most legal theories will find the mala in se to be the proper target 
of the criminal law, more controversial are the great many regulatory 
offenses that pervade modern criminal codes. These types of offenses are 
properly regarded as mala prohibita: they acquire their putative 
wrongfulness only via the operation of the law, not due to their character. 
One might think, given the first clause of C* (that an offense must be of the 
kind that violates others’ civic freedom) that no mala prohibitum could 
qualify as a criminal act. I believe, however, that at some kinds of regulatory 
violations could, under certain conditions, be properly classified as criminal 
acts: those that threaten to undermine the security that is critical to the 
realization of civic freedom. 
I am thinking here of offenses such as impersonating a police officer or 
escaping from a correctional facility. These types of offenses do not harm 
anyone in the way the mala in se do. But given the role that police, or prisons 
play in ensuring public safety in our world, acts of this nature threaten the 
structure reasonably implemented by the government to provide a secure 
environment in which citizens can pursue their conceptions of the good. To 
violate that system is to violate a political condition of others’ civic freedom 
(security). Acts of this nature are therefore reasonably criminalized. 
 
 
84. See Wayne LaFave’s analysis of the criminal negligence (or recklessness) standard in 
American law. WAYNE LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 181 (2003). 
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Finally, the criminal law can reasonably prohibit on certain types of 
conduct that harm the state as a whole, but not individual citizens. The most 
obvious example here is treason—but much more common will be tax 
evasion. This is not the kind of crime for which we can easily say that one 
person harmed or wronged another. But a well-functioning government is 
necessary in order to preserve citizens’ ability to pursue their ends, and this 
will require that all citizens contribute in some way to the maintenance of 
the government—which typically (though perhaps not inevitably) involves 
taxation. Exempting oneself from the payment of (reasonable, fair) taxes is 
therefore tantamount to repudiating the freedom of one’s fellow citizens. 
So far, we have seen that the Kantian definition of crime, C*, is 
consonant with a wide swath of conduct we already consider to be criminal 
in our system. There are, however, a number of important categories of 
offenses which would need to be excised from our criminal codes in order 
to comply with C*. These include licensing violations, merely self-harmful 
conduct, possessory offenses, public nuisances, and private immorality. 
Governments regulate many activities, and sometimes violations of 
such regulations are criminalized. Perhaps the most common example of 
this is driving without a driver’s license. To be sure, there are good reasons 
for requiring citizens to obtain licenses to operate vehicles. Cars, trucks, 
motorcycles, and the like are quite useful, but also potentially dangerous. 
The licensing requirement allows the government to be sure that people who 
are operating such equipment are reasonably familiar with traffic 
regulations, have sufficiently good eyesight, and so forth. Still, the question 
is whether the failure to follow such regulations should constitute a criminal 
act. The answer, according to our C* formula, is no: driving without a 
license does not, by itself, constitute a hindrance to others’ civic freedom. 
Your choice to drive without a license does not prevent me from speaking 
my mind, practicing my religion, and so on. It might, should the fact become 
known, make me feel marginally less safe—but my bodily security is not 
impacted in the way that it would be if you assaulted me.85 
 
 
85. This would not, however, prevent the use of unlicensed status as an aggravating factor in, 
say, a vehicular homicide case. It is also important to note here that in many jurisdictions there can be 
disparate reasons for losing a driver’s license. Some are due to a driver’s demonstrated dangerousness 
on the road (e.g. by committing multiple DWI offenses), while others might have nothing to do with 
driving per se (e.g. failing to pay court fines, child support, or other obligations not related to vehicular 
safety). There is, to be fair, a more compelling justification for criminalizing driving without a license 
in the former set of cases than the latter. Still, I do not believe the threat of possible future dangerousness 
overcomes the inherent harmlessness of the act itself.  
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It is also worth noting that decriminalizing regulatory violations such as 
driving without a license is not the same as legalizing them. Surely police 
officers should be allowed to stop unlicensed drivers, courts should fine 
them, and perhaps repeat offenders should lose their vehicles. Such civil 
sanctions may be calibrated as appropriate to deter undesirable conduct—
but they would not result in incarceration and the stigma of criminality. 
The second category of purported crimes precluded by C* is comprised 
of offenses which can formally be characterized as merely self-harming. 
The obvious target here is the myriad of drug and other substance-related 
acts that pervade our current system. If I choose to ingest a noxious 
substance, I may well harm my body or mind—and, if Kant is right, I 
thereby violate a duty to myself.86 But my ingestion of a toxic substance 
does not, by itself, violate the formal, external conditions that enable 
citizens to pursue their ends within society. Of course, if you happen to be 
a family member or close friend, my intemperance may constitute a setback 
to your interests—even a substantial emotional harm. There has, however, 
been no violation of the formal conditions that underwrite your civic 
freedom. 
Contrast this example with one where my ingestion of a particular 
substance is a proximate cause of physical harm to you. If I cause a car 
accident because I am drunk, or stab someone because I am in the midst of 
a drug-induced psychosis, I have interfered with the condition of bodily 
integrity that is an obvious sine qua non of exercising freedom. I would 
justly be held criminally liable in these cases. But here the crime in question 
is not ingestion of alcohol or drugs per se—though such an act might be a 
moral wrong, it does not by itself interfere with the formal conditions of 
civic freedom. 
In the face of such an analysis, one might be tempted to point to the 
various social ills that accompany the use of illegal drugs—such as the 
violence that may attend black market transactions. Setting aside for a 
moment the question of whether or not drug sales ought to be criminalized, 
even people who purchase illegal drugs for merely personal use contribute 
to the market. And if it turns out that the existence of such a market 
contributes negatively to other citizens’ civic freedom, then do we not have 
good reason for labeling as criminals those who choose to participate in such 
a market? 
 
 
86. See KANT, supra note 16, at 180 (6:427). 
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Upon reflection, however, we will see that the first condition of C* 
cannot be met by criminalizing drug purchasing. If Daniela purchases a 
gram of methamphetamine for herself, there is nothing about this act in and 
of itself that interferes in any way with other citizens’ freedom. It is true that 
Daniela’s purchase may contribute in a small way to the methamphetamine 
market, and the existence of that market may be causally related to an 
increase in social problems such as violence. But this is the case only 
because methamphetamine is illegal in the first place. The violence 
accompanying the drug market exists primarily because the market is itself 
illegal.87 It operates outside the normal regulatory apparatuses that govern 
legal transactions between citizens. One need not worry about being 
murdered by the corner grocer, even if one chooses to buy cigarettes, 
doughnuts, or other unhealthy products from him. The lack of security in 
the drug trade has nothing to do with the substances in question, and 
everything to do with the way those substances are treated within society. It 
is perverse to use the negative effects of criminalizing drug sales as a 
justification for criminalizing drug purchases—yet that is precisely what the 
“social ills” objection to drug decriminalization does. 
The next logical question, then, is whether the manufacture, creation, 
marketing, or sales of illegal drugs should be criminalized. It is common to 
assert that people who supply drugs are more to blame for attendant social 
ills than those who merely use them. This seems correct. Still, the question 
at hand is not how evil people are, but whether their actions ought to be 
proscribed by the criminal law. The answer, I think, is that while we rightly 
judge certain substances to be injurious to individuals who use them, we are 
expecting the criminal law to do too much work when we demand that it 
penalize and punish people who supply unhealthy, even dangerous, 
products. For one thing, it is unnecessary. In the United States, for example, 
we have done a good job of decreasing the prevalence of cigarette smoking 
through non-criminal means.88 More importantly, supplying noxious 
 
 
87. For further discussion, see HUSAK, supra note 1, at 45-54. In particular, Husak argues that 
“the very harms that drug proscriptions are designed to prevent [are] caused by the proscriptions 
themselves.” Id. at 46. While this is overstated (for example, there are obvious health harms that result 
from ingesting many drugs regardless of their legality), it seems accurate insofar as it relates to harms 
deriving from the market (production, transfer, etc.) rather than the drug itself. 
88. For example, the rate of smoking among white male adults decreased from roughly 60% in 
1965 (a year after the influential Surgeon General’s report on the negative health effects of smoking) to 
less than 25% in 2008 and 19% in 2014. The reductions were less dramatic, but still substantial, for other 
demographic groups. Bridgette E. Garrett, et al., Cigarette Smoking—United States, 1965-2008, 60 
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substances fails the test in C*: selling drugs does not, by its nature, violate 
others’ freedom. If people choose to purchase drugs and ingest them, they 
may, by doing so, make it more difficult for themselves to pursue their life’s 
goals. But that choice is not one imposed on them by others and, therefore, 
others should not be held criminally liable simply because they encouraged 
or enabled such an unwise decision.89  
A similar analysis will cause us to reject the criminalization of merely 
possessory offenses. This includes the possession of drugs, of course, but 
also of other substances or objects. Two initially troubling examples here 
are the possession of weapons and of child pornography. In the United 
States, of course, the possession of firearms is held to be a constitutional 
right—yet many people are prosecuted because they lack a proper license, 
or have a prior criminal conviction, or possess an unlawful kind of weapon. 
And while pornography depicting adults is legal, those who possess 
pornography involving children are prosecuted alongside those who create 
or distribute it. The question before us is whether the mere possession of a 
harmful or morally repugnant object is sufficient to trigger criminal 
sanctions. 
In the case of guns and other harmful objects, we confront a much 
harder case, given the prevalence of gun violence in our society. Even 
granted the clear compelling social interest in regulating firearms, we must 
nonetheless conclude that merely possessing such items cannot be grounds 
for criminalization. C* requires that the purportedly criminal conduct 
violate another’s civic freedom, and it is hard to imagine how the gun I keep 
locked away in my closet prevents you from pursuing your own ends. 
 
 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 109-13 (2011), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6001.pdf [https://perma.cc/PA2B-RNJH]; and Ahmed Jamal, et 
al., Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults—United States, 2005-2014, 64 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1233-40 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6444.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F7WT-6NG6]. 
89. Once again, this is not to say that people who manufacture methamphetamine, trade 
cocaine for sex, or engage in other kinds of unseemly behaviors are making morally praiseworthy 
choices. In some cases, such people may be morally reprehensible—in many others, they may be 
desperate addicts themselves, as much in need of society’s mercy and assistance as their customers. In 
any event, I suspect that any visceral reaction against what I have proposed here is due to judgments 
about the moral worth of drug-related activities, rather than consideration of the extent to which those 
activities hinder the expression of civic freedom. 
 Also note that a different result might be reached if, say, A sells B drugs knowing that they are 
tainted, or knowing B intents on ingesting a lethal dose. In such a case, a criminal act has occurred. But 
surely that act is reckless endangerment, negligent homicide, or the like—it is not the act of selling an 
illicit substance per se. 
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Obviously, the moment a dangerous weapon is used to threaten, wound, or 
kill another human being (absent legal justification or excuse), a criminal 
act has been committed. But possession alone is not such an act. The mere 
possession of weapons, like drugs, should therefore not be criminalized. 
Importantly, though, this conclusion is compatible with assertions many 
might make that there are too many guns in the United States and too many 
people infatuated with them; that the Second Amendment purports to 
instantiate a right that has no clear basis in natural law; that we ought in 
general to discourage people from possessing dangerous weapons, 
including firearms; and so forth. It is also compatible with the proposition 
that the government can and should require licenses for people to possess 
dangerous weapons—and can justifiably take civil action against those who 
possess unlicensed weapons. 
The possession of child pornography, while apparently similar to the 
possession of a firearm, cannot be treated in the same way. Because a child 
cannot consent to be the subject of the pornography, both the creation and 
consumption of such images violates the child’s bodily integrity. Thus, 
while the possession of adult pornography, in which the subject is assumed 
to be a consenting adult, should not be criminalized, the possession of child 
pornography should be.90 
Two final categories of conduct which should be excluded from the 
purview of the criminal law are what I will call public nuisances and private 
immorality. The former category consists of behavior which many citizens 
find distasteful or offensive. If I allow my dog to run freely in the public 
square, or swear on the subway, you may quite reasonably be annoyed by 
my conduct. You may even find it somewhat more difficult to pursue your 
ends. But because such actions do not, by their nature, violate your civic 
freedom, they cannot be regarded as criminal acts. Again, this is not to say 
 
 
90. At least two caveats are in order here. First, given the state of technology, it might be 
possible to create pornographic images of children without actually involving children in the process. 
As unpalatable as it sounds, this may well be a legitimate defense to the possession of child pornography 
on the Kantian view. (And, from a policy standpoint, it would be better if those who are intent on 
consuming child pornography do so in a way that does not, in fact, harm any children.) Second, there 
are presumably many cases where the subjects of adult pornography are not willing participants. Anyone 
coerced into pornography would be rightly considered the victim of a crime such as assault—but the 
question is whether people who merely possess such images should be prosecuted criminally. Assuming 
that there is no easy way to tell whether a particular (adult) pornographic image is the result of coercion 
or not, it seems that the right approach here is to attack this problem from the supply side, rather than 
criminalizing conduct which does not, by its nature (the mere viewing of obscene material) violate 
others’ civic freedom.  
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that the government has no interest in promoting virtuous conduct. Fining 
people for certain kinds of nuisances—parking too long in a particular area 
or littering on the public way, for example—may be a reasonable method of 
deterring such conduct. But prosecuting annoying individuals as criminals 
threatens both to curtail civic freedom and minimize the importance of the 
criminal law. 
The second category concerns behavior that people engage in privately, 
rather than publicly. The most obvious offenses here are sexual behaviors 
that some might object to on moral or religious grounds. While some sexual 
misdeeds, such as rape or sexual abuse, clearly interfere with the political 
condition of bodily integrity, having consensual sex does not. Any such act 
(between adults, at least) therefore clearly falls outside the aegis of the 
criminal law. For example, homosexuality has become more readily 
accepted in recent years but has historically been the subject of criminal 
prosecutions. And many still object to polygamous or other types of 
nonstandard arrangements. Given the wide variety of views about such 
matters, it would be overly facile to assert that there is no such thing as 
immoral sex between consenting adults. Still, it is hard to imagine a 
consensual sexual act that, in and of itself, interferes with another’s civic 
freedom. For this reason, such private acts, no matter how vigorously 
condemned by the wider community, cannot be the basis for 
criminalization. 
Two harder cases implicating sexual relationships are adultery and 
prostitution. We could easily imagine a case in which adultery results in a 
great deal of harm—more harm, surely, than many acts of theft or even 
assault. Moreover, while it may be true that adultery does not interfere with 
the conditions necessary for the free use of one’s body, adultery could 
certainly interfere with the stability of the family—and the family is surely 
an important social structure. Why, then, should we think that adultery 
should not be criminalized? After all, if petty theft is a crime because it 
interferes with the conditions that make property ownership possible, then 
should we not assert that adultery is a crime because it interferes with the 
conditions that make family bonds possible? And are not strong families as 
important to society as private property rights? 
There are two possible responses here. The first is a practical, 
consequentialist one. Our society has not, historically, done a very good job 
of integrating “family values” into the legal system. In the criminal context, 
we have implicitly countenanced domestic violence by failing to criminalize 
or prosecute it, and we have failed to treat women and men equally with our 
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laws regarding sexual violence. On the other hand, we have valued certain 
types of familial arrangements over others—heterosexual over homosexual, 
monogamous over polygamous. The result has been the criminal 
prosecution and social persecution of citizens whose family choices fall 
outside the norm. Given this background, one could reasonably admit that, 
in theory, adultery could be considered a criminal offense but, in practice, 
we should simply stop the pernicious practice of attempting to regulate 
sexual and family relationships via the criminal law, because doing seems 
likely (if history is a reliable guide) to result in more harm than it prevents. 
A more Kantian response would start by acknowledging that the 
formation and maintenance of family systems is, indeed, an important social 
good. Kant appears to have viewed marital rights as akin to property rights.91 
While putting family relationships in the same category as property rights 
may seem odd, it helps make sense of what the act of adultery entails from 
the perspective of justice. Adultery is a violation of the contractual 
obligations of marriage, just as delivering an inferior product than the one I 
have contracted with you to buy is a violation of the contractual obligations 
of commerce. Adultery is also a moral wrong;92 but it constitutes injustice 
only to the extent that one has violated a legally enforceable promise. The 
legal remedy for adultery should, therefore, be analogous to the legal 
remedy for violating a commercial contract: the contract is broken, perhaps 
with damages paid to the adversely affected party. Adultery is thus seen as 
 
 
91. Both are contained in the portion of the Rechtlehre entitled “Private Right,” which deals 
largely with property rights and family relationships. KANT, supra note 16, at 37 (6:245). Here it is 
important to acknowledge that Kant held certain views repugnant to contemporary sensibilities. He 
asserts that homosexuality is on par with bestiality, id. at 62 (6:277); that there exists a “natural 
superiority of the husband to the wife,” id. at 63 (6:279); and so forth. We need not regard such comments 
as integral to Kant’s larger moral and political theory. Moreover, while Kant was, like all of us, partly a 
product of his time, we should give him some credit for having a kind of proto-egalitarian view of sexual 
and family matters. Thus, he describes (heterosexual) sexual intercourse as being a matter of reciprocal 
acquisition, id. at 62 (6:278) (emphasis added), and marriage as being an “equality of possession . . . of 
each other as persons,” id. at 63 (6:278) (emphasis in original). Even where he acknowledges the alleged 
“superiority” of the husband, he qualifies this as being compatible with “the natural equality of a couple.” 
Id. at 63 (6:279). He also insists that children have a natural right to be cared for by their parents, id. at 
64 (6:280), and that parents have the duty to educate their children “both pragmatically, so that in the 
future [they] can look after [themselves], and morally, since otherwise the fault for having neglected 
[them] would fall on the parents,” id. at 65 (6:281) (emphasis removed). 
92. On the Kantian view, at least, it is morally wrong on two counts. First, it violates the duty 
to respect others (one’s spouse, certainly, and perhaps one’s illicit lover as well). Id. at 209 (6:462). 
Second, it violates one’s duty to oneself, because in acceding to sexual desire under such circumstances, 
one “surrenders his personality . . . since he uses himself merely as a means to satisfy an animal impulse.” 
Id. at 179 (6:425). 
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a legal reason for divorce (in jurisdictions that still require such grounds), 
since one party has breached the marital contract. Contrast the cases of a 
contract breach and adultery on the one hand with the cases of theft and 
spousal abuse on the other. The thief has violated the conditions (property 
rights) making commercial contracts possible. The abuser has violated the 
conditions (“equality . . . in their possession of each other as persons”93) 
making marriage possible. Theft and abuse are therefore rightly viewed as 
criminal acts, while breaches of contract and adultery are not. 
Prostitution presents a case that is in some ways quite similar to 
adultery. In theory, prostitution involves the consensual exchange of sex for 
money (or some other benefit). While some have moral objections to 
prostitution based on the notion that it is an improper kind of sexual conduct, 
we have seen (as with adultery) that this cannot be the basis for 
criminalization. Since an uncoerced market transaction does not, by itself, 
violate anyone’s freedom, the requirements of C* cannot be met. 
Prostitution would seem, therefore, an obvious target for Kantian 
decriminalization. 
In the real world, of course, prostitution is not always (and perhaps is 
rarely) as simple as a market transaction. Prostitutes may in fact be enslaved, 
or at least be subject to unjust coercion at the hands of others. And, as in the 
drug trade, the black (or at least gray) sex market may carry with it attendant 
social ills, including violence, substance abuse, and so forth. Again, 
however, it is worth considering whether these characteristics are inherent 
in the act of prostitution, or whether they are due to the criminalization of 
the sex market. There is at least some evidence that the latter is the case94—
if so, then the Kantian solution should please those concerned with the 
negative consequences of black-market prostitution as well. 
To summarize, then, applying the criteria in C* will result in the 
criminalization of many acts which we intuitively think of as crimes—both 
the mala in se and at least some kinds of mala prohibita. It will also have 
the effect of decriminalizing many acts currently criminalized in our system, 
which would go a long way toward addressing the problem of 
 
 
93. KANT, supra note 16, at 63 (6:278). 
94.  For example, social science researchers found that the (accidental) decriminalization of 
prostitution in Rhode Island resulted in lower rates of both rape and gonorrhea. Scott Cunningham & 
Manisha Shah, Decriminalizing Indoor Prostitution: Implications for Sexual Violence and Public Health 
11-17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20281, 2014), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w20281.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RRF-HSWN]. 
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overcriminalization described in §I.B above. Some decriminalization 
advocates might say that this Kantian approach does not take us far enough. 
Still, it is a systematic way of determining the limits of criminalization that 
is founded upon a compelling normative political theory. The same certainly 
cannot be said of our current practices. The burden is therefore on those who 
desire an even more limited criminal law to develop a more convincing 
theory. 
III. OBJECTIONS & RESPONSES 
In this section, I shall confront three of the most salient objections to 
the Kantian view: that the definition developed above (C*) fails to explain 
what is wrong about prototypical criminal acts; that the concept of civic 
freedom is insufficiently broad to capture what is most valuable to human 
beings in civil society; and that the application of C* fails to address certain 
types of wrongful acts by nontraditional actors—such as environmental 
harms caused by corporations. 
A. The Nature of Wrongness 
The first objection to conceptualizing crime as I have above has to do 
with the nature of the mala in se. In these cases, the objection goes, it seems 
insufficient, perhaps even callous, to think of the criminal as having done 
wrong because he has violated conditions of civic freedom. The wrong the 
murderer has committed is murder, the wrong the rapist has committed is 
rape, and so on. To say otherwise is grossly insufficient as a characterization 
of the act in question (and may also fail to accord the victim the respect she 
is due).95  
I believe this objection misses the mark. It is obviously the case that the 
principle wrongness of a malum in se consists in the harm done to the victim. 
But it is nonetheless coherent to say that committing such an offense both 
harms another individual and also violates the political conditions 
underwriting all citizens’ freedom. A criminal who commits one of these 
 
 
95. For example, in objecting to a fair-play conception of crime, Antony Duff argues that such 
a view “create[s] an implausible separation between [an act’s] wrongness as a crime and the moral 
reasons in virtue of which it should be a crime; between its criminal and its moral character.” R. A. 
DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 212-13 (1986). The objection seems equally strong when lodged 
against the Kantian view. See also R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 22 
(2001) for a similar argument. 
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acts causes serious harm to victims but, in doing so, also violates laws 
protecting all citizens’ capacity to enjoy their civic freedom. Thus, crimes 
such as murder and rape are both acts of terrible violence against human 
beings and acts that vitiate the notion of reciprocal freedom for all citizens. 
To state that an act is a crime in the sense of violating the conditions of civic 
freedom does not, as the objection seems to imply, somehow take away 
from its moral wrongness—it simply designates the wrong at issue as one 
the state is justified in protecting citizens against. 
Consider a heinous crime such as rape. Rape is a gross moral wrong that 
causes great harm. But it is a crime to commit rape, not just because one has 
greatly harmed another, but because such actions violate a basic freedom of 
bodily integrity that is a desideratum of any just society. Rape will always 
be evil, but it cannot be a crime (except in the poetic sense of the term) 
outside of civil society. 
Indeed, one might be concerned that the objection, if taken seriously, 
fails to distinguish crimes from evils. Surely we want to be able to say that 
rape is morally wrong even in the state of nature.96 That it also happens to 
be a crime (and, concomitantly, that a gross injustice would occur should a 
society fail to criminalize it) need not detract from our appreciation of its 
fundamental wrongfulness. At the same time, criminal punishment within 
civil society is justified in the case of rape because rape is the kind of evil 
that is properly criminalized—other wrongful acts (lying to a loved one in 
order to save face, for example) simply do not qualify as wrongs we can 
permissibly punish in this way. 
If my response here is compelling, then we are in a position to see how 
conceiving of crime as the violation of the law’s guarantee of the political 
conditions of freedom helps explain one feature of the criminal law that 
might otherwise seem puzzling: the jurisdictional limitations on crime. For 
example, the State of Minnesota cannot punish someone who commits 
murder in Argentina. The jurisdictional problem is not merely a matter of 
convenience. Rather, the problem is that the government can only coerce its 
own citizens: those who can reasonably be said to be bound by the principle 
of reciprocal freedom to the laws of their own state. The State of Minnesota 
can, of course, make a moral judgment that the Argentine murderer has done 
something wrong—but Argentine citizens are not bound by the laws of the 
 
 
96. This term is used by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau as a kind of 
thought experiment to discuss what life would be like in the absence of government. See, e.g., JOHN 
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 116-22 (Mark Goldie ed., 2000). 
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State of Minnesota. Thus, the Argentine murderer has committed no crime 
in Minnesota—and Minnesota law has no claim on him. Moreover, if 
Argentina had no law against murder, the Argentine murderer could still be 
said to have done wrong, but not to have committed a crime. The lack of a 
law in Argentina against murder would, of course, be an injustice in itself—
but not an injustice against Minnesota’s citizens. This helps explain why 
murder (or rape, assault, etc.) would be morally wrong in the state of 
nature—but would not be a crime, since such a concept cannot exist outside 
civil society. 
B. The Insufficiency of Freedom 
In this essay, I have largely relied on Kant’s account of civic freedom 
to describe the contours of the criminal law. But one might worry that this 
reliance on freedom is misplaced, for there are other values that are 
important in our civic life.  
This is the kind of criticism that legal scholar Ekow Yankah directs at 
Arthur Ripstein, who also endorses a freedom-centered interpretation of 
Kant’s political theory. Yankah alleges that Kantian freedom “begins to 
look too thin” when one considers what is intuitively required of a just 
society.97 Two examples he gives are the provision of basic health care 
services and “paternalistic” laws such as seatbelt requirements. He suggests 
that freedom, while important, cannot explain why the state should ensure 
that its citizens receive health care, nor why the state is justified in enacting 
seatbelt legislation. Moreover, Yankah contends, Ripstein’s Kantian 
account cannot explain the “necessary richness of civic bonds,” which are 
an important part of life in civil society.98 Thus, Yankah thinks that, while 
Ripstein gives a compelling account of the importance of Kantian freedom 
in political life, he fails to acknowledge our “shared moral ties grounded in 
other political values.”99 Yankah concludes that a model of civic 
republicanism is superior to the Kantian approach. 
Yankah may be correct that Ripstein’s account alone cannot explain 
why the government should provide basic healthcare services or enact 
seatbelt legislation. But this does not mean that the Kantian view incorrectly 
 
 
97. Ekow Yankah, Crime, Freedom, and Civic Bonds: Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: 
Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, 6 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 255, 264 (2012). 
98. Id. at 268. 
99. Id. at 271. 
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delineates the contours of the criminal law. The purpose of the criminal law 
is to guarantee the political conditions of civic freedom. Being healthy may 
help citizens attain their ends, but that is a question of wellbeing and 
equality, not of freedom in this limited sense. So governmental provision of 
health care, however important a social condition of civic freedom, is not a 
matter with which the criminal law should be concerned. Moreover, in the 
case of seatbelt laws, Kant provides us with good reasons not to criminalize 
the failure to wear a seatbelt. Failing to wear a seatbelt is asinine but does 
not interfere with other citizens’ ability to pursue their ends.100 The 
government may certainly encourage seatbelt use, just as it reasonably 
discourages cigarette smoking—so long as it does not, in doing so, interfere 
with the conditions enabling citizens to exercise their freedom in ways 
contrary to those suggested by the government. 
So, one response to the kind of objection Yankah pursues is to 
acknowledge an apparent limitation of the Kantian approach. Indeed, such 
a limitation is to be embraced in the context of criminalization because it 
provides us with a means of limiting the ever-expanding scope of the 
criminal law discussed in section I.B above. The purpose of the criminal 
law is not to ensure a perfectly safe, healthy, and productive life for all 
citizens. It is simply to remove obstacles to the most basic requirements of 
civic freedom that might be put in one’s way by other citizens—to “hinder 
hindrances to freedom.”101 The government might reasonably mount an 
advertisement campaign encouraging citizens to wear seatbelts, or 
promulgate regulations requiring automakers to install seatbelts—but it 
should not bring the force of the criminal law to bear on those who choose 
to put themselves in danger by declining to cooperate. The criminal law is 
rightly concerned with the preservation of basic human freedom, not the 
attainment of human flourishing.  
Again, while an appeal to civic freedom properly cabins the scope of 
the criminal law, Yankah’s concern with civic bonds and civic virtue is 
well-founded. Indeed, some would argue that a Kantian approach to 
criminal justice entails a scheme of civic virtue similar to the one Yankah 
 
 
100. Failing to put one’s child in a seatbelt, or appropriate restraining mechanism, is a closer 
case. Perhaps it is neglectful, in which case the Kantian analysis would indicate it is an appropriate 
subject for criminalization, because it endangers the child’s security, even her future capacity to live as 
a free citizen. 
101. RIPSTEIN, supra note 50, at 55. 
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advances.102 Concern for civic virtue should certainly influence the way we 
treat offenders and victims and the way we approach our own interactions 
with the criminal justice system. (Indeed, it should also cause us to ensure 
our fellow citizens’ access to basic services such as health care, education, 
and so forth, which Yankah rightly notes are important parts of a just 
society.103 The concept of civic virtue need not, however, alter the concept 
of the criminal law as a protector of civic freedom, a minimal requirement 
of a just society.  
C. Hard Cases 
In this subsection, I address several aspects of the criminal law that 
seem to work against the account I developed in §II. In particular, I have 
not explained what to do about non-citizen offenders or victims. I have also 
said nothing about juvenile law, nor about corporate criminal liability. I will 
address these areas briefly, then turn to a more difficult question: what to 
do about laws protecting animals and the environment. My comments in 
this section should not be construed as definitive statements, but rather as 
demonstrating that the foregoing Kantian analysis at least provides a fruitful 
starting point for further analysis. 
1. Non-citizens, Juveniles, and Corporations 
In this chapter so far, I have proceeded under the assumption that 
criminal offenders and victims are citizens of the polity in which the 
criminal offense has occurred. In reality, of course, this is not always the 
case. A crime committed in Minnesota might, for example, involve a victim 
from Mexico and a perpetrator from Canada. At first, this appears to present 
a significant problem. Why prosecute a crime committed against a Mexican 
citizen? After all, her civic freedom is supposed to be upheld by the 
government of Mexico, not that of the United States (or Minnesota). And 
how can we prosecute a Canadian citizen, who has made no promise, as a 
naturalized immigrant might, to uphold the laws of the State of Minnesota? 
This problem, however, is not as troublesome as it may first appear. 
Kant addresses this issue briefly in one of his essays, in which he argues 
that visiting foreigners have a right to “hospitality” and that, because of this, 
 
 
102. See, e.g., Holtman, supra note 32. 
103. Yankah, supra note 97, at 261-64. 
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they cannot “be treated with hostility . . . as long as [they] behave[] 
peaceably.”104 Developing a full account of non-citizen rights and liability 
based on the notion of hospitality is outside the scope of this article. The 
basic idea, however, is that we can conceive of non-citizen visitors as having 
voluntarily adopted the minimal requirement of good citizenship—that is, 
obedience to the criminal law—in exchange for the freedom to move about 
the country, participate in commerce, and so on, while being protected by 
the criminal law.105 So, although the criminal law is justified by appealing 
to notions of citizenship (specifically civic freedom), its application is not 
limited to citizens, but to anyone within the borders of the polity.106 
The issue of criminal liability for juveniles is also straightforward. To 
the extent that juveniles are properly viewed as less than full moral agents, 
the system that we use in the United States of adjudicating juvenile 
delinquents (instead of designating them as criminals) is justified, and 
compatible with the Kantian picture. Treating juveniles differently (and, in 
theory, less harshly) from adults, even when they commit similar offenses, 
seems intuitively compatible with Kant’s views on moral development and 
autonomy.107 
Corporate criminal liability presents a slightly more complicated 
problem. Although it seems facially absurd to claim that a corporation can 
be guilty of a crime, it is worth considering why we might want to impose 
corporate criminal liability. There are at least three reasons. The first is that 
individual criminal responsibility might be diffuse within an organization. 
Although sometimes one corrupt executive might be entirely to blame, in 
other instances corporate “crimes” may result from relatively small 
decisions by a number of individuals. Rather than trying to determine 
exactly who did what, it is easier for the government to simply prosecute 
the corporation as a whole. Second, criminal justice is swifter than civil 
justice. Although one might balk at the number of months criminal cases 
 
 
104. Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, in IMMANUEL KANT: 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 315, 328-29 (Mary Gregor, ed. & trans., 1996) (8:357). 
105. Such an account would likely be consonant with the “Kantian cosmopolitanism” espoused 
by KLEINGELD, supra note 65. 
106. Of course, a more detailed discussion of non-citizen visitors would need to explain what 
to do in situations where people find themselves involuntarily within the borders of a polity. It would 
also need to address contemporary practices such as the detention (supposedly on civil, not criminal, 
grounds) of undocumented immigrants and the existence of diplomatic immunity for some criminal acts. 
107. For a summary of those views, see Barbara Herman, Training to Autonomy: Kant and the 
Question of Moral Education, in PHILOSOPHERS ON EDUCATION: NEW HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 255 
(Amélie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1998). 
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take to get resolved, this is nothing compared to the years of litigation 
typical in civil practice. Corporate misdeeds generally receive a lot of media 
attention, and governments may wish to show its citizen-consumers that the 
corporation is being punished (relatively) quickly. Third, the government 
may wish to take the case on behalf of “the people,” which is the model in 
criminal cases, rather than waiting for individuals (or classes) to sue the 
corporation privately on their own behalf. Partly the government may wish 
to be perceived as taking a strong stand against corporate malfeasance, and 
partly they may be legitimately concerned with the ability of individuals to 
navigate the tricky (not to mention expensive) legal waters of civil law. 
These are all reasonable considerations. They are, however, merely 
pragmatic concerns that can be addressed without resorting to the 
imposition of criminal liability on corporations. For a contemporary 
example, consider the case of the Volkswagen emissions-fraud scandal.108 
The allegations were that Volkswagen vehicles were equipped with 
software that enabled emissions controls only during emissions tests; the 
controls were disabled at all other times. As a result, vehicles passed 
emissions tests that they would otherwise have failed, and consumers 
believed they were buying vehicles that were better for the environment 
than they actually were.  
Although we might assert colloquially that Volkswagen committed a 
crime, “Volkswagen” is just a trademark—it is not an autonomous agent 
and cannot “commit” anything. What really happened is that one or more 
people within the corporation decided that a good way to get around 
government environmental regulations would be to develop and install this 
software. It may be difficult to determine precisely who was involved with 
the fraud: did high-level executives order or approve it? Was it done by a 
rogue team of engineers? It would be nice if we did not have to make such 
determinations, and corporate criminal liability enables us to get by without 
doing so. Yet we cheapen the meaning of criminal justice by doing so: we 
make it into a tool of governmental convenience rather than a protector of 
civic freedom.109 Meanwhile, multiple civil lawsuits with punitive damages 
 
 
108. For an overview of the facts in this case, see Geoffrey Smith & Roger Parloff, Hoaxwagen, 
FORTUNE (2016), http://fortune.com/inside-volkswagen-emissions-scandal/ [https://perma.cc/Z78T-
9TMU]. 
109. Compare this with the peanut executive convicted of knowingly shipping tainted peanuts 
which resulted in several deaths. See Brady Dennis, Executive Who Shipped Tainted Peanuts Gets 28 
Years; 9 Died of Salmonella, WASH. POST, (Sept. 21, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/a-life-sentence-for-shipping-tainted-peanuts-
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or huge settlements are almost guaranteed in this case. And aside from 
possible individual prosecutions of Volkswagen employees, governments 
have plenty of ways short of criminal prosecution to manifest their 
displeasure with the company. 
Suffice it to say, then, that the Kantian has reason to worry that 
corporate criminal liability is more than a “legal fiction”—it seems difficult 
to square it with the purpose of the criminal justice system, which is to 
ensure the civic freedom of citizens by holding other citizens responsible 
for their actions that violate the UPR. Since a corporation cannot “act,” it 
cannot be held criminally responsible. Its employees are another matter, and 
large-scale fraud of the sort allegedly perpetuated by some Volkswagen 
employees certainly qualifies as criminal. 
2. Animals and the Environment 
A final question concerns the status of animals and the environment 
within the criminal justice system. There are some kinds of offenses that 
involve animals only derivatively. For example, it is a criminal offense in 
Minnesota to harm a service animal such that the animal becomes “unable 
to perform its duties.”110 This kind of criminal law is justifiable on the 
Kantian view because of the harm caused to the person using the service 
animal. Likewise, animals are sometimes treated legally as property: 
stealing someone’s pet may reasonably be treated as theft, not kidnapping. 
The harder cases, however, are those where the putative wrong at issue 
is harm to the animal itself rather than to its owner. For example, many 
jurisdictions have some kind of animal cruelty statute in their criminal 
codes. Minnesota’s is typical (if wordy): “No person shall overdrive, 
overload, torture, cruelly beat, neglect, or unjustifiably injure, maim, 
mutilate, or kill any animal, or cruelly work any animal when it is unfit for 
labor, whether it belongs to that person or to another person.”111 It is clear 
from the language of this statute (“whether it belongs to that person or to 
another person”) that the activity being criminalized is not harming 
another’s property, which happens to be an animal; rather, the alleged 
 
 
victims-families-say-yes/2015/09/19/e844a314-5bf1-11e5-8e9e-
dce8a2a2a679_story.html?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/8SLD-HEHS]. The peanut corporation itself 
is not the criminal, of course—it is the executive who approved shipping food he knew to be tainted 
with salmonella. 
110. MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 8a. (2018).  
111. MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 1. 
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wrongdoing lies in harming an animal, regardless of whether it happens to 
“belong” to the perpetrator or not. 
The prevalence of statutes that protect individual animals in this way 
poses a challenge to the Kantian view that the purpose of the criminal law 
is to ensure the civic freedom of citizens of a just society. Since harming an 
animal does not, by itself, have any deleterious impact on other people’s 
civic freedom, it would appear that the criminalization of animal cruelty is 
improper. But many people no doubt share the intuition that harming 
animals—or at least certain types of animals112—without good reason is a 
significant moral wrong. Indeed, I suspect many of us find it more repugnant 
to torture a dog or cat than to commit a petty theft or even a minor assault 
against a human being. 
Kant, moreover, is not exactly the patron philosopher of animal-rights 
activists. In an infamous passage, he avers that it would be morally wrong 
to kick one’s dog—but not because of the harm it causes the dog. Rather, it 
is because doing so diminishes one’s own virtue: kicking the dog makes one 
a crueler person.113 This view seems backwards, of course. It may well be 
true that one harms oneself by engaging in dog-kicking; but the primary 
harm and, hence, the locus of wrongfulness is surely causing the dog to 
suffer. 
Let us grant that Kant’s conception of the wrongfulness of dog-kicking 
is insufficient to explain the moral duties we have toward animals.114 As it 
happens, what may be perceived as a deficiency to the animal-rights 
proponent can be seen as a boon to the criminal-law theorist. For what the 
Kantian view of criminalization shows is that, regardless of the precise 
contours of our obligations toward animals, those moral obligations are not 
of the type properly regarded as criminal acts. Although it may be 
 
 
112. A significant hurdle to defining animal cruelty is determining which animals or classes of 
animals “count” for purposes of defining this kind of wrongdoing. If we take literally the notion that we 
ought not to harm any animals, then swatting flies would be cruel: if we start with the premise that we 
cannot unjustifiably harm any animal, then surely the inconvenience flies cause us is not a justification 
for killing them. And even if we restrict ourselves to only certain classes of animals (see, e.g., ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 3-2910(H)(1), defining “animal” as “a mammal, bird, reptile or amphibian”), then we must 
contend with the question of whether it is morally justifiable to kill animals in order to eat them. I am 
not sure what the right answer is here from a moral point of view, but I am confident that we should not 
use the criminal law in order to try to enforce it. 
113. See KANT, supra note 33, at 212 (27:458). 
114. Some contemporary philosophers have, however, derived more animal- and nature-
friendly accounts from Kantian premises. See, e.g., Paul Taylor, The Ethics of Respect for Nature, 3 
ENVTL. ETHICS 197 (1981). 
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counterintuitive to those of us who are used to thinking of animal cruelty as 
a crime, whatever moral wrong we do to animals, it is not the kind of wrong 
that interferes with other citizens’ civic freedom. The state is free to enact 
policies encouraging the proper treatment of animals. Animal rights 
activists could be allowed to sue in tort for the cruel mistreatment of 
animals.115 The Kantian analysis therefore yields the plausible conclusion 
that the criminal law should be reserved for those acts which threaten other 
human beings’ standing as citizens within their society. 
Does this reasoning extend to broader environmental harms? For 
example, consider this Minnesota statute: 
A person who knowingly disposes of or abandons hazardous waste 
or arranges for the disposal of hazardous waste at a location other 
than one authorized by the Pollution Control Agency or the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, or in violation of any 
material term or condition of a hazardous waste facility permit, is 
guilty of a felony . . . .116 
This is an example of a common type of criminal statute that “piggybacks” 
on a civil regulation. This may not be the ideal way to draft legislation, but 
it does not seem particularly problematic for our purposes. We would 
simply need to determine whether the regulation in question ensures the 
civic freedom of all citizens. Let us assume that hazardous waste causes 
great harm to people if it is disposed of improperly, and that requiring 
people to dispose of it properly avoids that harm. In such a case, it seems 
right to say that the state may justly enact criminal penalties for 
environmental harms such as hazardous waste disposal. 
One might, however, wonder whether environmental regulations, such 
as this one, are deficient for a reason similar to Kant’s condemnation of dog-
kicking. Perhaps what is wrong with at least some forms of environmental 
damage (and toxic waste disposal is a likely example) is that the natural 
world has been harmed in a non-trivial way. While we might not think that 
a river has the same interest in avoiding pain that a dog does, we might still 
 
 
115. A possible consequence of this move would be to increase the number of people exposed 
to liability for the mistreatment of animals, since the shift from the criminal to the civil system would 
lower the burden of proof. I will leave it to others to argue whether or not this would be a desirable state 
of affairs. My point is merely that criminal liability is not the only way of discouraging animal 
mistreatment.  
116. MINN. STAT. § 609.671, subd. 4. 
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want to say it has some intrinsic value. The river might be valuable qua 
river, regardless of whether human beings appreciate it as a source of water 
or power or even aesthetic pleasure. If this is the case, then once again we 
might object to environmental regulations that seem to situate wrongdoing 
in the violation of regulations, rather than in harm to the environment as 
such. 
We need not be overly concerned with this possibility. While it may 
well be true that a river contains a kind of intrinsic value of which human 
beings ought to be aware, and even if we are morally required to protect that 
value, we should nevertheless not utilize the criminal law in order to 
advance such values. Nor, indeed, do we need the criminal law in order to 
do so.117 While it may be tempting to enact criminal legislation in order to 
promote values such as animal welfare and environmental preservation, we 
should limit the criminal law to its Kantian purpose of protecting citizens’ 
civic freedom.  
Again, these suggestions should not be taken as definitive statements. 
Rather, my intent has been to show that the Kantian analysis developed in 
§II can generate useful arguments about difficult questions related to 
criminalization. I shall leave the derivation of more definitive conclusions 
for future work.  
CONCLUSION 
I began by pointing out, as others have, that our criminal justice system 
lacks a coherent theory underwriting out criminalization practices. I then 
argued that my interpretation of Kantian political theory allows us to 
generate a compelling theory of criminalization. I began with Kant’s 
reciprocal notion of civic freedom, in which all citizens are bound by just 
laws that ensure their ability to pursue their ends and argued that the general 
purpose of the criminal law should be to ensure the civic freedom of all 
citizens. After proposing a technical definition of a criminal act from this 
Kantian perspective, I showed that applying this definition would result in 
a smaller, though by no means parsimonious, criminal code. 
While I believe that this account provides a convincing response to 
critics of contemporary Anglo-American criminal justice systems who 
bemoan the tendency toward ever-expanding criminal liability, I will 
 
 
117. See the discussion of the Volkswagen case above, supra note 108, which can be easily 
reframed in terms of a commitment to environmental rather than consumer values.  
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nonetheless be content if readers disagree with my interpretations or 
conclusions—so long as this disagreement results in the proposal of other 
theories that might be weighed against my own on the scales of reason.  
The skeptical realist may deride the attempt to use philosophy to 
develop public policy, but surely the attempt to generate a reasoned theory 
of criminalization cannot help but result in a more just, equitable, and 
rational system than the sprawling, ad-hoc mess we currently call a criminal 
code. Thus, “[f]or my own part, I put my trust in theory.”118
 
 
 118.  KANT, supra note 55, at 309 (8:313). 
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